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WRONG WAY CORRIGAN AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NONPROFIT
LANDSCAPE: A NEED FOR NEW
LEGAL APPROACHES
James J. Fishman*
You see things; and you say "Why?"
But I dream things that never were;
and I say "Why not?"1
INTRODUCTION
In July 1938, an aviator, Douglas Corrigan, flew from Long Beach
California to New York's Floyd Bennett Field in Brooklyn. His flight plan
called for him to return to California. On July 17, Corrigan took off in thick
fog, and headed east because airport officials had told him to lift off in any
direction save west, as there were some buildings at the western edge of the
field. He continued flying east, claiming his compass indicated he was
heading west. After a twenty-eight hour, thirteen-minute flight, Corrigan
landed in Dublin, Ireland. He became a national hero, and his nickname,
"Wrong Way Corrigan," became a colloquialism describing anyone who
blunders and goes the wrong way.2
This essay argues that some of the assumptions by which we view and
regulate the nonprofit sector are traveling, as did Wrong Way Corrigan, in
the wrong direction. This is due to faulty assumptions about the nonprofit
universe, overreactions to perceived problems, and a reluctance to consider
innovative approaches to existing problems. This essay examines some of
the erroneous assumptions, discusses recent legislative initiatives, and
suggests that there is a need for more than incremental approaches when
considering the nonprofit landscape. It argues that regulation of fiduciary
behavior should be at the local level, or a combination of local and state
regulation, in contrast to federal enforcement. Federal tax law issues are
* Professor, Pace University School of Law.
1. Bernard Shaw, Back to Methuselah act 1, in Bernard Shaw Selected Plays with
Prefaces 7 (1949).
2. See 'Just Dumb Luck,' Corrigan Asserts, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1938, at 3; Pilot of
Old Plane Wings Toward Sea: Flier Who Came Non-Stop from Coast Vanishes Eastward on
His 'Return' Trip, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1938, at 1; Hugh Smith, Lost Way, He Says: Set Out
for California but Compass 'Got Stuck, ' He Asserts, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1938, at 1.
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appropriately left to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This essay also
will discuss the recent interest in for-profit social enterprise organizations.
The nonprofit sector has been under critical scrutiny from regulators,
legislators, the public, and the press. Scandals involving charities and their
fiduciaries appear regularly in the media. In recent years, this has led to
increased regulation of charities by the primary federal regulator, the IRS.
Whether regulation increases probity is problematic. For many
organizations, particularly smaller ones, additional regulation merely
increases the burdens of nonprofit status, or in economic jargon, transaction
costs, at the expense of focusing on mission.
I. ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS
A. There Is a Single Nonprofit Sector
The idea of a singular "nonprofit sector" that exists between business and
the government is a myth, and harmful when it comes to attitudes and
approaches to regulation. There are really many sectors, or types of
organizations, that are called nonprofit or even charities. Under the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC), there are at least twenty-eight types of organizations
entitled to be tax exempt. 3  The most important are the charitable
nonprofits, those exempt under § 501(c)(3) of the IRC. The 501(c)(3)
organizations have become so differentiated that it may be time to
reconsider the scope and definition of those organizations that fit within this
tax category.
The 1,064,191 § 501(c)(3) organizations registered with the IRS in 20064
have been divided into two categories: private foundations and public
charities. Private foundations are essentially organizations that have failed
certain tests of public support.5 The other 501(c)(3) organizations are
public charities, organizations to which contributions 6 are deductible for
federal tax purposes. 7 Over half of all organizations recognized as exempt
by the IRS are in this group. 8
3. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(l)-(28), 501(d), 501(e), 501(f), 501(k) (2000); see also I.R.C. §
521(a) (farmers' cooperative organizations).
4. Dep't of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service Data Book Publication 55B, at 56
tbl.25 (2006), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06databk.pdf.
5. More specifically, private foundations are organizations that have failed the public
support tests of I.R.C. § 509.
6. With the exception of organizations testing for public safety, contributions to private
foundations are also deductible, but the maximum amount of one's adjusted gross income
that can be deducted is less than for public charities.
7. I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2) (income tax), 2055(a)(2) (estate tax), 2522(a)(2) (gift tax).
However, contributions are not deductible to organizations testing for public safety, even
though they are 501(c)(3) charities.
8. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts
[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
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Within the 501(c)(3) group, vastly different organizations are treated
alike. Today, the 501(c)(3) category encompasses a diverse range of
organizations, from those with assets of billions of dollars, such as Harvard
University and various hospital systems, to those with no resources, such as
a three-member dance company. The sources of support for 501(c)(3)
organizations come from government at all levels, foundations, and
corporate and private donations. Fees for services have become a
prominent part of the financial structure. 9
The scale of activity of some charitable nonprofits is immense. At some
point quantitative differences in size become qualitative ones. One of the
justifications for nonprofit organizations is that they emerge where there is
market failure, that is, where the commercial market does not provide a
particular kind of service or good. 10 Despite the market failure rationale,
many nonprofits compete with and resemble their for-profit counterparts.
As government support declined as a result of the Reagan revolution,
there was a convergence of the for-profit and nonprofit sectors. II In the
latter decades of the twentieth century, nonprofits moved into activities
providing them with sources of revenue that were not normally considered
charitable and did not minister to the poor. Charities became commercial
entities, often indistinguishable from their for-profit counterparts. 12 No
sector represents this change more than the health-care industry. Hospitals
originated as institutions where the poor could come to die. By the end of
the twentieth century, nonprofit hospitals were largely indistinguishable
from their for-profit counterparts, both of which received the bulk of their
revenue from third-party payers-government and insurance-and often
provided minimal charity care. Should such forms of organization be
allowed to remain under the 501(c)(3) umbrella without the organization
demonstrating a tangible community benefit? 13  Recent developments
suggest not. 14
sports competition... or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda,
or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation [including the publishing or
distributing of statements] and which does not participate in, or intervene in [or
oppose] any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
9. According to the National Center for Charitable Statistics, the primary sources of
revenue for charities with $25,000 or more in assets were fees for services (70.9% of the
total); private contributions (12.5%); government grants (9%); investment income (3.9%);
and other income (3.7%). Urban Inst., The Nonprofit Sector in Brief 4 (2006), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311373_nonprofit-sector.pdf.
10. See Lester Salamon, America's Nonprofit Sector: A Primer 12-13 (2d ed. 1999).
11. See generally Burton A. Weisbrod, Conclusions and Public-Policy Issues:
Commercialism and the Road Ahead, in To Profit or Not to Profit: The Commercial
Transformation of the Nonprofit Sector 287, 287-305 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998).
12. See Stephanie Strom, Make Money, Save the World: Businesses and Nonprofits Are
Spawning Corporate Hybrids, N.Y. Times, May 6, 2007, § 3, at 1.
13. The affirmative test of exemption for hospitals changed from a "relief of poverty"
rationale, which required hospitals to treat indigent patients without regard to their ability to
pay, Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, to a community benefit standard, where charity care
2007]
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The "charitable" category needs to be redefined and perhaps narrowed.15
In the past, public benefit and relief of the poor were the central purposes of
public charities. 16 Clearly, charities have drifted from this core, albeit
narrow, function. Frances R. Hill has recommended that the public charity
focus return to its roots. 17 Mark A. Hall and John D. Colombo have
suggested that public charities be limited to organizations that receive a
certain amount of their budgets from private donations. 18
We should also ask questions about the scope of the 501(c)(3) universe,
an issue which has regulatory implications: What should be the role of
nonprofits in a modern economy? What should be the scope of nonprofit
business? Should charities be allowed to compete with for-profit
organizations and under what circumstances? What should be the role of
government in financing charitable activities and organizations, and what
sort of control should the government have over these activities? When
should state action force private organizations to open their operations to
scrutiny? How much community benefit should an organization provide
before it is eligible for 501(c)(3) status? Should we require charitable
nonprofits to help the poor and provide tangible public benefits, or is that
too constraining?
Redefinition of the charitable sector will not be an easy task. What does
community benefit mean, and do we really expect many charities besides
those that obtain their revenues by charging for goods and services, who
could give those goods and services away, to be able to show a tangible
community benefit? 19 And should the IRS make that determination? It
may be easy to justify stripping nonprofit hospitals of their tax-exempt
was not a requirement, Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. See James J. Fishman & Stephen
Schwarz, Nonprofit Organizations: Cases and Materials 353-77 (3d ed. 2006).
14. See John D. Colombo, The Failure of Community Benefit, 15 Health Matrix 29
(2005). For a review of the literature on whether the nonprofit form results in different
financial behavior or results in charity care for the poor, see John D. Colombo, The Role of
Tax Exemption in a Competitive Health Care Market, 31 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 623
(2006).
15. A winnowing of the category has occurred in the past. For example, in 1986 Blue
Cross insurance plans lost their status as 501(c)(3) organizations when Congress enacted
I.R.C. § 501(m) (2000), which disqualifies an organization from exemption under §§
501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) if a substantial part of its activities are providing commercial-type
insurance.
16. This originated with the Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.).
17. See Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways &
Means, 109th Cong. 61-68 (2005) (statement of Frances R. Hill, Professor, University of
Miami School of Law); see also Stephanie Strom, What Is Charity? N.Y. Times, Nov. 14,
2005, at Fl.
18. Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax
Exemption, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 1379 (1991). Professor Colombo recently testified before the
House Ways and Means Committee to that effect. See Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector:
Hearing Before the Comm. On Ways & Means, 109th Cong. 57-61 (2005) (statement of
John Colombo, Professor, University of Illinois College of Law).
19. This was the concern of Justice Lewis Powell in his concurrence in Bob Jones
University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 608-11 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).
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status if they provide no charity care, but what about nonprofit day care
centers or assisted living homes that give nothing away?20
B. Nonprofits Inhabit a Sector of Society
Between the Private and Public Sectors
Another misassumption is the belief that the nonprofit sector stands
between government and the private sector, as a third or independent sector.
The leading trade association for charitable nonprofits is the Independent
Sector. The name is an oxymoron, perhaps wishful thinking, for nonprofits
are neither independent of private enterprise nor government. They are
intertwined at a number of levels and always have been.21 Nonprofits
mimic for-profit firms, and the private sector plays a substantial and
growing role in the nonprofit sector through joint ventures, corporate
sponsorships, purchases of mailing lists, exclusive licensing agreements,
and other forms of financial collaboration. 22 This interlocking relationship
between nonprofit, government, and the private sectors dates back to the
earliest years of European settlement. 23
Today, many nonprofits engage substantially, if not excessively, in
regular business activity. Some museum shops resemble department stores.
Universities profit from the commercialization of higher education, through
lucrative research and licensing transactions, forays into dot-corn
businesses, and endorsement and outsourcing of functions. Many charitable
nonprofits remain reliant on government financing.
20. For a powerful argument that relying on the amount of charity care is an insufficient
justification alone for preserving the exemption of nonprofit hospitals, see Jill R. Horwitz,
Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 Yale J. on Reg. 139 (2007). Professor Horwitz
presents evidence that hospital ownership, whether for-profit, nonprofit, or government-
owned, has a significant effect on the mix of medical services offered. Nonprofit hospitals
provide medical services that are unlikely to be provided by other hospital types, and
removal of the exemption would lead to other costs to society. See id.
21. See Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing. Growing Links
Between Nonprofits and the Rest of the Economy, in To Profit or Not to Profit: The
Commercial Transformation of the Nonprofit Sector, supra note 11, at 1, 1-4.
22. Strom, supra note 12. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has become concerned
about the enormous increase in joint ventures and other relationships between for-profits and
nonprofits. In a number of rulings and cases, the IRS has established parameters for joint
ventures between nonprofits and for-profits. See St. David's Health Care Sys. v. United
States, 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003); Redlands Surgical Serv., 113 T.C. 47 (1999), aff'd, 242
F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974; Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B.
718.
23. The establishment of Harvard in 1629 demonstrates the early fusion of the public
and private spheres. The college, chartered as a corporation, was governed by ministers of
the tax-supported Congregational Church and by government officials sitting ex officio.
Harvard possessed a small endowment received from private donors. Most of its revenues,
however, came from legislative grants and tuition and fees. The institution was considered
public. See Peter Dobkin Hall, Inventing the Nonprofit Sector and Other Essays on
Philanthropy, Volunteerism and Nonprofit Organizations 16-17 (1992). It was not until the
mid-nineteenth century that Harvard could be considered private in the modern sense.
20071
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Business structures have influenced nonprofit approaches. Many
nonprofits have spawned for-profit subsidiaries. 24 At the same time, for-
profit firms are encroaching upon traditional nonprofit turf in such areas as
health care and education. Government (the public sector) and the private
nonprofit sector are extensively interconnected and influence one another.
Congress routinely authorizes, and federal agencies administer, many
domestic policy programs through nonprofit organizations. 25  Private
nonprofit agencies may receive all, or nearly all, of their revenue from the
government. Such institutions range from social services organizations to
the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory, which until recently was administered
by a university. How independent are organizations that are primarily or
exclusively funded by the government? Should these organizations be
treated as government agencies?
C. Fraud, Misappropriation, and Breaches of Fiduciary Duty
Are Extensive in the Sector
"Charity," Paul told the Corinthians, "beareth all things, believeth all things,
hopeth all things, endureth all things. Charity never faileth."'26  Though
charity may never faileth, those who administer charities do so with regularity.
Or, in the words of a very different voice, Oscar Wilde, "Charity creates a
multitude of sins." 27 The contemporary nonprofit sector has been criticized
for permitting defalcations of charitable assets to occur, for a lack of fiscal
controls, and for an absence of accountability to the public and to the
government.
In recent years we have become aware of the seeming proliferation of
scandal in the nonprofit sector. No organization, it seems, is too elevated to
be touched. The misdeeds typically involve corporate governance lapses,
conflicts of interest, defalcation of funds, and excessive compensation. It
seems several times each week that Philanthropy Today, a daily chronicle
of events in the philanthropic community, publishes an item involving
charity fraud. The nonprofit sector has become of interest to the general
press. 28 For example, after a two-year investigation the Los Angeles Times
uncovered serious corporate governance lapses, conflicts of interest, and
excessive compensation at the Getty Museum.29 The Washington Post and
24. Reed Abelson, Charities Use For-Profit Units to Avoid Disclosing Finances, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 9, 1998, at A l; Mark Maremont, Doing Well: Kennedy Nonprofit Has Benefited
the Poor and Its Officials, Too, Wall. St. J., Mar. 25, 1998, at Al.
25. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543,
595 (2000).
26. 1 Corinthians 13:6-7.
27. Oscar Wilde, The Soul of Man Under Socialism and Selected Critical Prose 128
(Linda Dowling ed., Penguin 2001) (1891).
28. This interest is episodic, as no paper assigns reporters to the "charity beat" on a full-
time basis.
29. See Jason Felch, Ralph Frammolino & Robin Fields, Munitz Steps Down as Head of
Getty Trust, L.A. Times, Feb. 10, 2006, at Al.
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The Boston Globe have engaged in important investigative expos6s. 30
Cumulatively, such journalistic efforts and the resulting drumbeat of bad
publicity have awakened Congress and the public and have tarnished the
nonprofit halo. The increased focus on the sector seems to indicate there is
extensive fraud throughout.
A study of wrongdoing by charitable fiduciaries conducted by Marion
Fremont-Smith and Andras Kosaras found 152 organizations over seven
years whose fiduciaries were accused of criminal or civil wrongdoing.31 Of
the 152 incidents, 98 detailed criminal activity. Another 54 involved
breaches of the duty of loyalty and prudence-self-dealing, failing to carry
out the charity's mission, and negligent management of assets. A further 6
involved both civil and criminal activity. The authors conclude there is
serious underreporting of such incidents and that a root cause of
wrongdoing is a failure of governance. 32
Is the charity scandal glass half full or half empty? Even though there
may be serious underreporting of charity fraud, there are a large number of
nonprofit organizations, over one million in the 501(c)(3) category alone 33
out of a total of 1,045,979 tax-exempt organizations on the IRS's master
file in 2005, 34 would seem to indicate that misfeasance is not such a
problem. No one knows the extent of wrongdoing. Certainly the misdeeds
do not necessitate the increased burdens on nonprofits that have been
adopted, or the Sarbanes-Oxley 35 type reforms that have been proposed. 36
Has wrongdoing increased or has the added scrutiny merely uncovered
more misdealing? Many fiduciaries in almost all contexts and periods have
30. See Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Nonprofit Sells Scenic Acreage to Allies at a
Loss, Wash. Post, May 6, 2003, at Al (reporting that the Nature Conservancy resold donated
land with development restrictions at a loss to a trustee or supporter, followed by a charitable
contribution to make up the difference in value, allowing the buyer to take charitable deduction).
The Washington Post's coverage triggered an IRS audit, an investigation and report by the
Senate Finance Committee staff, and a one-day hearing on June 8, 2005. See Francie Latour
& Walter V. Robinson, Trustees Reimburse Charitable Foundation, Boston Globe, Apr. 14,
2006, at B1; Walter V. Robinson & Michael Rezendes, Foundation Chief Agrees to Repay
over $4m, Boston Globe, Dec. 16, 2004, at Al. An executive summary of the staff report,
The Tax Code and Land Conservation: Report on Investigations and Proposals for Reform,
is available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/other/tnccontents.pdf.
31. Marion Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and Directors of
Charities: A Survey of Press Reports 1995-2002, 42 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 25, 25 (2003).
The study reviewed newspaper reports of charity scandals published between 1995 and 2002
by Lexis/Nexis, a service that retains online 13,111 English-language news sources,
including daily newspapers from all the major American cities.
32. Id.
33. See Dep't of Treasury, supra note 4.
34. Dep't of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service Data Book Publication 55B, at 39
tbl.22 (2004), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04databk.pdf.
35. See Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11,
15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.).
36. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure
Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 205 (2004). California is
the only state to have adopted legislation based on Sarbanes-Oxley. See Cal. Nonprofit
Integrity Act, Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12585-12599 (West 2005).
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breached their trust; and the attempt to regulate charities and fiduciaries has
largely been ineffective.37 With the advent of the Internet and electronic
availability of data, the sector is more transparent than ever before, and the
constraints imposed by the fear of negative publicity have encouraged many
organizations in the sector to become more sensitive to and improve their
governance practices on their own. The outliers exist and always will, but
behavior at the margins in any endeavor differs from norms at the center.
Misassumptions about the charitable nonprofit sector have led to
regulatory initiatives. Congress has enacted and proposed numerous
changes for the sector, ostensibly to increase transparency and diminish
fraud, but many of the efforts have increased the regulatory burden with
little added benefit. Others have tilted the regulatory fulcrum toward the
federal government and away from its historical state and local locus. The
diversity of the charitable nonprofits has not been fully recognized. The
most significant development of the last half century has been the
emergence of the federal government through the IRS as the primary
regulator of charitable nonprofits.
II. THE FEDERAL INTEREST IN CHARITABLE ACCOUNTABILITY
A. Local Enforcement38
Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, most charities were local,
particularly those engaged in poverty relief. In the cities, many overlapping
social service agencies provided assistance to the "worthy" poor. These
charities often received local and state funding. There were charity boards
at all levels of government that oversaw the distribution of such funds.
Questions of ineffective governance by the offending organization or a lack
of accountability were not the significant issues they are today. Charity
fraud occurred and was thwarted. Local district attorneys treated these
matters as run-of-the-mill criminal cases. Misappropriation of charitable
funds was no different than embezzlement from a bank. The organization
would be dissolved, and the individual charged, convicted, and sentenced to
prison. Issues of corporate governance did not arise until much later.
Eventually, self-regulatory efforts emerged.
In the 1870s charity organization societies emerged in the eastern United
States and later spread to cities in the West. The Charity Organization
Society (COS) was a coalition of agencies that sponsored relief for the
poor.39 COS heads were leading citizens, a city's establishment. These
organizations attempted to coordinate social relief, monitor the
accountability of charities, assure that only the worthy poor received relief,
37. See generally James J. Fishman, The Faithless Fiduciary and the Quest for
Charitable Accountability 1200-2005 (2007) (tracing charity fraud from 1200 through the
present).
38. See id. at 269-70.
39. Hall, supra note 23, at 39.
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and root out fraud. 40 COS leaders were self-appointed sentries against
fraud by individuals seeking relief or by social service charities spending
money improperly. They reflected hostility to the poor and tended to find a
substantial amount of fraud in poverty relief, a conclusion that was often
contradicted by individual social service agencies. 4 1 The COS officials had
powers of arrest and often brought criminal complaints against individuals
accused of charity fraud.42 Additionally, these COSs began to rate charities
and found that some were fronts for fraud, often vehicles where public
money could be tapped for private gain.43 This approach is attempted today
by a few organizations such as the Better Business Bureau's Wise Giving
Alliance and Charity Navigator.
Even though the state attorney general had the common law authority to
monitor charities, the primary official enforcing charities' accountability
was the local district attorney or similar law-enforcement official, who
treated charitable misdealing or fiduciary breaches as bread-and-butter
criminal activities. Not until the 1940s did decisions attribute fiduciary
breaches as violations of nonprofit corporate law. 44 There were more cases
40. The objectives of the Charity Organization Society (COS) were
1. To be a centre of intercommunication among the various churches and
charitable agencies in the City. To foster harmonious co-operation among
them and to check the evils of the overlapping of relief.
2. To investigate thoroughly, and without charge, the cases of all applicants
for relief which are referred to the society for inquiry, and to send the
persons having a legitimate interest in such cases full reports of the results
of investigation. To provide visitors, who shall personally attend cases
needing counsel and advice.
3. To obtain from the proper charities and charitable individuals suitable an
adequate relief for deserving cases.
4. To procure work for poor persons who are capable of being wholly or
partially self-supporting.
5. To suppress mendicity by the above means and by the prosecution of
impostors.
6. To promote the general welfare of the poor by social and sanitary reforms
and by the inculcation of habits of providence and self-dependence.
Charity in New-York, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1883, at 9. The COS merged into the
Community Service Society in 1938. Community Service Society,
http://www.cssny.org/about/history.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2007).
41. Id. Charles D. Kellogg, from the COS central bureau, says 65% of a sample from
40,000 cases of public charity were misdirected. Id. The United Hebrew Charities and the
Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor each found that only 1.5% were
unworthy of relief. Id.
42. To counteract fraud against charity, the New York City COS created a "Central
Bureau" to which social service charities would make reports of their cases to eliminate
frauds or to avoid duplication of relief. See Charged with False Pretenses, N.Y. Times, Feb.
11, 1883, at 5.
43. For example the New York Juvenile Guardian Society received $10,000 annually
from the legislature and $13,000 from other sources, ostensibly to run schools for poor
children. However, none of its schools were maintained for any length of time. The
organization was a front for Tammany Hall. A Questionable Charity, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27,
1872, at 2; The Bureau of Charities, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1874, at 5.
44. Cf People v. Volunteer Rescue Army, 28 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1941).
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relating to breaches of trust, perhaps because charitable trustees were more
circumscribed in their actions.
B. State Regulation: The Attorney General
Traditionally, in common law jurisdictions the attorney general, a state
official, was responsible for the oversight of charitable activities. 45 The
earliest American cases involving charities where the attorney general
participated concerned the validity of charitable gifts and issues of cy
pres.46 Fremont-Smith notes that the power to correct wrongdoing was
rarely invoked before the Second World War.47 This is surely correct as it
applies to the monitoring of charities by attorneys general.
There were other officials at the state level that regulated certain types of
charities, though most enforcement until the mid-twentieth century was at
the local level. Social service agencies that received state and local funding
were accountable to state boards. Sometimes there were state boards of
charity. In other states the same board that regulated prisons was
responsible for social service organizations. There were a variety of
approaches. 48 Charitable organizations, such as educational or health-care
institutions or museums, were regulated by state officials charged with
overseeing that particular field. Neither those officials nor the attorney
general were general watchdogs of charitable accountability.
Under modem nonprofit statutes and judicial decisions, the attorney
general has the responsibility of supervision and oversight of charitable
trusts and corporations and may maintain such actions as appropriate to
protect the public interest.49  Attorney general effectiveness overall in
enforcing charitable accountability is problematic. Fraud cases are resource
intensive, and, as a result, enforcement is necessarily selective. Adding to
the state burden was that, until recently, there was little coordination of
information between the IRS and state attorneys general. One promising
45. 4 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 348.2 (4th ed. 1989);
Gareth Jones, History of the Law of Charity, 1532-1827, at 160 (1969).
46. Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State
Law and Regulation 54 (2004).
47. Id.
48. By the beginning of the twentieth century, state supervision of charities and
corrections was the norm in forty-two states. States differed as to whether there were one,
two, or three boards overseeing state charities, social service agencies, and penal institutions.
Twenty-two states had a single board for all three fields. Massachusetts and New York had
a separate board for each of the three fields. California had separate boards for each field,
with an additional fiscal board over the other three. See Frederick H. Guild, Administration
and Supervision of State Charities and Corrections, 10 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 327, 327-28
(1916).
49. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 5142, 5250, 6511, 9230 (West 2006); N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp.
Law § 112 (Consol. 2002); Rev. Model Nonprofit Corp. Act §§ 1.7, 3.04, 8.10, 14.03-.04.
See Fremont-Smith, supra note 46, app. I, at 476, for a state-by-state guide. In a few
jurisdictions, this role is performed by the district or county attorney.
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development in leveraging limited state resources is that Congress has
broadened the information that the IRS can share with state officials. 50
One should not forget that attorneys general are political creatures. In
many states, the acronym "AG" stands for "aspiring governor," and the
selection of which issues to focus upon and which individuals and
organizations to prosecute has a political tinge. This has led, in Evelyn
Brody's phrase, to "parochialism," where the attorney general forces a local
option to benefit the people of a particular state where the charity is
incorporated at the expense of the interests of the organization and its
beneficiaries. 5 1 Despite a recent flurry of high-profile cases in a few states,
regulation at the state level has been neither efficient nor effective. The
lack of resources, a lack of will, and other, more pressing responsibilities
have made state regulation of charities more theoretical than real. In the
words of Professor Harvey Dale, a longtime observer of the nonprofit
sector,
[G]ovemment regulators (and most particularly attorneys general, to
whom the law confides the principal role in policing charities) tend to
allocate their scarce regulatory resources to other more politically potent
portions of their domains. In most states, the Charity Bureau of the
Attorney General is inactive, ineffective, overwhelmed, or some
combination of these.52
Though state attorneys general historically were responsible for charities'
accountability, their lack of resources and other priorities resulted in the
IRS becoming the primary regulator of nonprofit behavior.
50. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1224, 120 Stat. 780, 1091-
93 (codified in scattered sections of the I.R.C.). Upon written request by an appropriate state
officer, the IRS may disclose a notice of proposed refusal to recognize an organization as a §
501(c)(3) organization; a notice of proposed revocation of tax exemption of a § 501(c)(3)
organization; the issuance of a proposed deficiency of tax imposed under I.R.C. § 507; the
names, addresses, and taxpayer identification numbers of organizations that have applied for
recognition as § 501(c)(3) organizations; and returns and return information of organizations
with respect to which information has been disclosed concerning the above informational
matters. In addition, the IRS can disclose or open to inspection the returns and return
information of an organization that is recognized as a valid § 501(c)(3) organization, or has
applied for such status if the IRS believes there has been noncompliance with state law in the
jurisdiction of the appropriate state officer.
51. See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity
Law Enforcement, 79 Ind. L.J. 937 (2004). One example is that the attorney general of
Pennsylvania opposed the sale of Hershey Chocolate Co. to a foreign buyer because it would
harm the people who worked for the company, though it would have benefited the Hershey
Trust and its beneficiaries. Id. at 985-99. A second example: Eliot Spitzer, who was hardly
a passive attorney general of New York, was silent about the conversion of Empire Blue
Cross and the use of nonprofit assets to increase hospital workers' wages instead of creating
a private foundation devoted to health care. Silence was politically sensible. Mr. Spitzer
made no secret he intended to run for governor, and in New York, union support is crucial
for a Democratic candidate.
52. Peter Swords, Nonprofit Accountability: The Sector's Response to Government
Regulation, 25 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 413, 413 (1999).
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C. The Federal Interest in Charitable Accountability
Until the twentieth century, the federal government had no interest in the
regulation of charities. The introduction of federal taxation was to change
all that, as it has in so many other areas of modem life. The automatic
nature of obtaining tax exemption and deductibility of contributions initially
encouraged this lack of federal oversight. 53 Charities have been granted
preferential federal tax status since the first income tax was created in
1894. 54 Federal tax law relating to nonprofits has not consistently evolved
but has resulted from politics, policies, and reactions to perceived abuses of
the nonprofit structure.
Professors John Simon, Harvey Dale, and Laura Chisolm have
recognized four essential functions of federal tax policies that shape the
treatment of nonprofits. They are the support, equity, border patrol, and
regulatory functions. 55 The police function, which this essay addresses,
regulates the fiduciary behavior of trustees, directors, managers, and
donors. Traditionally, this was the role of state law since nonprofits were
creatures of state corporate law and state fiduciary standards. The purpose
of the federal tax system is to raise revenue. Beginning in 1969 with
private foundations, Congress, through its primary regulatory agency of the
53. A report in the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, known as the
Filer Commission for its chair, stated,
The essence of the advantage of [the coordinate privileges of tax exemption and
deductibility] is that it is automatic. The government does not control the flow of
funds to the various organizations; the receipts of each organization are determined
by the values and the choices of private givers. The donors determine the direction
of their own funds, and the distribution of "tax savings" as well. The income of
each individual organization is a product of donations it receives and the
investment wisdom of its managers. Since all of these operations are out of the
hands of government under the exemption and deduction statutes, the beneficiary
organizations receive their governmental aid without having to petition for it.
Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its
History and Underlying Policy, in 4 Research Papers Sponsored by the [Filer] Commission
on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs 2025, 2039 (1977).
54. Internal Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (repealed 1895). This statute
was declared unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601
(1895). The Corporation Excise Tax of 1909 contained an exemption for charities in
language that parrots most of the modern § 501(c)(3). Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909,
ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113.
55. See John Simon, Harvey Dale & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of
Charitable Organizations, in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook 267, 267 (Walter
W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006). The support function encourages the
continuation and expansion of the nonprofit sector through relief from taxation. The equity
function, with its goal of redistributing resources, has roots in the history of charity and in
Anglo-American law in the Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.). The
issues here relate to questions as to whether exempt status should be conditioned on service
to the poor and how much private benefit donors should receive for their contributions. The
border patrol function deals with the limits of activity in which nonprofits may engage.
There are absolute prohibitions on participation in political campaigns, constraints on the
amount and types of lobbying by nonprofits, and restrictions on commercial and unrelated
business activity. These limits patrol the nonprofit-business border.
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nonprofit sector, the IRS, a subdivision of the Treasury Department, has
played an increasing role. 56
Fremont-Smith has identified three stages in the federal development of
charity regulation. 57 In the first, which lasted roughly until the 1940s,
broad definitional parameters were established as to the boundaries of
charity status. 58  In the second stage, a border between exempt and
nonexempt organizations was drawn when Congress enacted the unrelated-
business income tax in 1950. In the third phase, there was an expansion in
the IRS's regulatory functions: first with the 1969 adoption of severe
limitations on private foundations and their managers; second with the 1996
enactment of the intermediate sanctions legislation. 59 A fourth phase seems
to be emerging, where federal fiduciary norms of behavior may be applied
to all § 501(c)(3) charities, replacing the primacy of state law. 60
D. Federal Efforts to Monitor Charitable Accountability
Prior to the 1950s, the IRS's initial focus on charities was at the front
end-i.e., assessing whether the organization met the requirements for tax-
exempt status.6 1 Not until 1954 did a purportedly exempt organization have
to obtain a determination from the IRS that it was entitled to that status,
though with the exception of churches, almost all organizations that relied
56. There are other federal agencies that oversee nonprofit activity. They include the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, through its economic crimes unit; the Federal Emergency
Management Agency; the Federal Trade Commission; the United States Postal Inspection
Service; and the Office of Personnel Management. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-
02-526, Tax-Exempt Organizations: Improvements Possible in Public, IRS and State
Oversight of Charities 69-71 (2002) [hereinafter GAO Report]. These agencies play a very
minor role compared to that of the IRS.
57. Fremont-Smith, supra note 46, at 300.
58. Id. This enabled donors to deduct from their own tax liability charitable
contributions to certain nonprofits. This stage, which lasted roughly until the Second World
War, relied upon self-policing to assure accountability.
59. I.R.C. § 4958 (2000). This enabled the IRS to impose an excise tax on managers and
organizations that provided insiders with excess benefit transactions, such as excessive
compensation. Previously, all the IRS could do was revoke the exemption of the
organization. The remedy was usually more draconian than the offense and was rarely
employed.
60. Congress has considered extending federal fiduciary standards beyond the private
foundation category and into the territory of all § 501 (c)(3) charities, though as of yet has not
acted.
61. For example, the insular collector of taxes of the Philippine Islands, then under U.S.
control, challenged the right of a Philippine religious order, Sagrada Orden de Predicadores,
to qualify for exemption. The insular collector argued that though the order was religious, it
was not operated exclusively for such purposes because it derived significant revenue from
real estate and securities holdings and more modest revenues from the sale of wine,
chocolates, and other items for use within its religious missions. The U.S. Supreme Court
held that as long as the profits were dedicated to charitable or exempt purposes, the
organization would not lose its exemption. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 denied exemption to feeder corporations. Pub L. No. 91-
172, § 502, 68A Stat. 1, 166 (codified at I.R.C. § 502 (2000)). A tax on unrelated business
income was imposed on some tax-exempt organizations and later imposed on all.
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on contributions did obtain such a ruling from the IRS.6 2 The sheer number
of organizations seeking exemption, the complexity of the tax laws relating
to the tax-exempt sector, and the limited resources of the IRS make the
gatekeeping approach chimerical in terms of assuring that recognized
exempt organizations will be accountable.
The IRS's Division of Tax Exempt and Government Entities is
responsible for regulatory oversight. Initially, it can screen nonprofit
organizations when they apply for recognition of tax-exempt status.
Thereafter, a small percentage of Form 990 annual returns are examined. In
the past decade, the number of applicants has doubled. 63 In 2001, 58,938
applications were received requesting recognition of 501(c)(3) status. Of
those, 10,548 were disposed of because the applicant did not submit a fee or
did not submit all documents or because the application was withdrawn. Of
the 42,366 completed applications submitted, only 58 were denied.64 This
means that organizations that fill out the application in boilerplate fashion
will almost automatically obtain recognition of exemption. Ultimately, the
IRS's lack of scrutiny may affect grants and contributions available to new
organizations. Traditionally, the recognition-of-exemption letter has been a
seal of approval for foundations and other donors. If the perception spreads
that the IRS's scrutiny is pro forma, donor confidence could be affected. 65
The Treasury Department first required all tax-exempt organizations to
file an annual-information return in 1942. The two-page form covered the
1941 tax year and consisted of three questions, an income statement, and a
balance sheet. The Treasury's authority to impose this requirement was
challeged and compliance was poor.66 Neither the IRS nor anyone else
imagined that Form 990, the annual report, would exponentially expand in
62. Fremont-Smith, supra note 46, at 61. In 1954, the Treasury made filing an
exemption mandatory, upon which the organization received a determination letter that
recognized its exemption. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(6) (as amended in 1990).
63. Elizabeth Schwinn & Grant Williams, A Challenge for the IRS: Lack of Funds and
Manpower Taxes Agency's Ability to Regulate Charities, Chron. of Philanthropy, Aug. 23,
2001, at 1. The figures cited by Schwinn and Williams were provided by the IRS but differ
slightly from those reported in the GAO Report, supra note 56, at 21. The GAO stated that
the IRS did not have data for fiscal years 1996 and 1997.
64. GAO Report, supra note 56, at 21 tbl.2.
65. See Schwinn & Williams, supra note 63, at 28-29.
66. Fremont-Smith, supra note 46, at 65. In 1943, the Treasury sought statutory
authority from Congress, which had become concerned with reports of abuse of charitable
status. Id. at 59, 65. Congress required certain exempt organizations, principally
foundations, to file returns that would disclose their financial affairs. Revenue Act of 1943,
ch. 63, § 117, 58 Stat. 21, 36-37. Excluded from this filing requirement were churches and
other religious organizations, certain educational institutions, and certain publicly supported
organizations. One purpose of the 1943 legislation was to provide Congress with sufficient
information to determine if further legislative restrictions were needed. See generally
Laurens Williams & Donald V. Moorehead, An Analysis of the Federal Tax Distinctions
Between Public and Private Charitable Organizations (1975), reprinted in 4 Research
Papers Sponsored by the [Filer] Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs 2099
(1977).
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pages and importance to become the principal disclosure tool for
government oversight of exempt organizations. 67
Though it contains a substantial amount of financial information, Form
990 does not provide a way to analyze the effectiveness of the
organization's attainment of its mission. Nor does the IRS have the
resources to examine more than a very small number of returns filed.6 8 It is
now targeting for audits selected areas where abuses have been
discovered. 69 The complex system of federal charity regulation has not
developed with a particular logic or plan, but largely in response to
perceived abuses of charitable status. A primary catalyst for imposing
accountability under the tax system has been the private foundation.
E. The Private Foundation Restrictions
As mentioned, private foundations are § 501(c)(3) organizations but are
not "public charities. '70  Private foundations have been more strictly
regulated and circumscribed in their activities than other charities. 7' The
distinction between public charities and private foundations seemed to be
based on Congress's view that public charities satisfy more pressing social
needs or have been endorsed by a kind of public referendum-that is,
people have voted with their charitable donations to support them.
Churches, schools, and hospitals fall into the charmed public-charities circle
because they are the most venerable and influential members of the
charitable sector. 72  Another reason for the distinction between public
charities and private foundations is the belief that the former are more likely
to use their resources for the public benefit more quickly than private
67. The form has continually been revised to contain more information. All private
foundations and most other 501(c)(3) charities' annual reports are online with GuideStar.
Fremont-Smith, supra note 46, at 65-67, tracks the changes in the form.
68. From 1995 to 2003, the number of Form 990 annual returns filed with the IRS
increased by 51% (274,129) while the number examined declined from 2% to .7% (10,450 to
5754). Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, Description of Present Law Relating to
Charitable and Other Exempt Organizations and Statistical Information Regarding Growth
and Oversight of the Tax-Exempt Sector 38 tbl.5 (2004), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-44-04.pdf. Beginning in 2003, the IRS has reversed the rate of
decline in examinations and staff, though not in sufficient numbers to make a substantial
difference. See IRS Comm 'r Testimony: Charitable Giving Problems and Best Practices
Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. 13 (2004) (statement of Mark W. Everson,
Comm'r of Internal Revenue) [hereinafter Statement of Mark W. Everson], available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-04-081 .pdf.
69. Statement of Mark W. Everson, supra note 68, at 14.
70. Id. at 3.
71. There is a fundamental distinction in the Internal Revenue Code between public
charities and private foundations. The former category, which includes schools and
hospitals, is tax favored, because these charities have passed extremely complicated tests of
public support. The second category, private foundations, is generally funded by fewer
people and lacks the broad base of public support. Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 55, at
268-69, 283-84.
72. See Boris I. Bittker, Should Foundations Be Third-Class Charities?, in The Future of
Foundations 132, 142-43 (Fritz F. Heimann ed., 1973).
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foundations, which keep the great corpus of their wealth in a permanent
endowment.
Because of their wealth, and the influence that wealth brings, it should be
of no surprise that foundations have come under ongoing criticism. At one
time, the criticism was justified. A 1965 Treasury report identified a
number of problems in the private-foundation sector that needed legislative
attention: (1) the use of the foundation form produced an undue lag
between the charitable gift generating the tax benefit and the use of the
funds for charitable purposes; (2) foundations were becoming a
disproportionate segment of the national economy; and (3) foundations
represented a dangerous concentration of economic and social power.73
The result of Congress's concern was a complicated enforcement regime by
which private foundations were regulated more strictly than public
charities. 74 Sections 4940 to 4945 were added to the IRC and imposed a
sliding scale of excise taxes (depending upon the offending foundation's
willingness to correct its wrong) for abuses in which Congress felt private
foundations were most likely to engage. These excise taxes were imposed
on private foundations, their managers, sometimes their principal donors,
and in some cases even government officials. 75 The 1969 reforms also
73. Staff of S. Comm. on Fin., 89th Cong., Treasury Department Report on Private
Foundations 6-7 (Comm. Print 1965).
74. This is a dauntingly complex area of the law. The description here does not do it
justice. See generally Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 13, at 781-90; Fremont-Smith, supra
note 46, at 264-85. For a more technical analysis, see generally Bruce Hopkins & Jody
Blazek, Private Foundations: Tax Law and Compliance (2d ed. 2003).
75. Private foundations are subject to an excise tax of two percent on their net-
investment income. I.R.C. § 4940 (2000). This fee was originally four percent. It can be
reduced to one percent if the foundation increases its charitable distributions by a specified
amount. I.R.C. § 4940(e). This is less a tax than an audit fee, the purpose of which is to raise
funds to monitor foundations. Private foundations are also subject to excise-tax sanctions if
they engage in proscribed activities such as self-dealing, I.R.C. § 4941; if they do not meet
certain minimal annual distributions for charitable purposes in relation to their investment
assets, I.R.C. § 4942; if they have excess business holdings in the principal donor's family
business, I.R.C. § 4943; if they make investments that may jeopardize the carrying out of the
foundation's exempt purposes, I.R.C. § 4944; and if they make taxable expenditures
inconsistent with a private foundation's mission, such as expenditures for lobbying,
electioneering, voter registration, grants to organizations that are not classified as public
charities, or other non-charitable purposes, I.R.C. § 4945. The self-dealing provisions
prohibit transactions between a private foundation and individuals termed "disqualified
persons," who are major donors, trustees, officers of the foundation, members of their
families, business associates, and related business entities. I.R.C. § 4946.
Types of prohibited self-dealing transactions between a disqualified person and a private
foundation-though each has exceptions-are sales, exchanges, and leases; loans; furnishing
of goods, services, or facilities; payment of excessive compensation; transfer of foundation
assets or income; and payments to government officials.
The excise taxes for violation of these prohibitions are graduated. If a foundation, a
disqualified person, or a foundation manager violates a proscription, the person or entity will
be subject to an initial tax. The wrongdoers will probably seek to correct the violation. In
some situations the excise taxes may be abated. If the violators do not correct and unwind
the transaction, a much higher second-tier tax will be imposed. Only the most flagrant
violations risk loss of tax exemption for the foundation.
[Vol. 76
RECENT NONPROFIT DEVELOPMENTS
assured that private foundations would not sneak through the exemption
process as public charities. There is a presumption that organizations
seeking recognition of their tax exemption are private foundations unless
they can prove they are public charities by fitting into one or more of the
four categories in the code of non-private foundations. 76
The private foundation rules have served their purpose. They have
curtailed extensive fiduciary misbehavior without overly restricting the
sector. At the time they were enacted, some thought that the use of the
foundation as an organizational form would end. There was a decline in the
creation of new foundations after the Tax Reform Act of 1969, a decline
which was reversed in the 1990s. 77 Fremont-Smith has shown that, with
the exception of the tax for failure to make minimum distributions, very
little revenue has been raised.78  Recently, she has argued that the
restrictions on private foundations should be eliminated, placing them on
equal footing with public charities. 79 This is a sensible proposal for larger
foundations, those with over $30 million in assets, but most of the abuses
lie with smaller foundations, which are more likely to run afoul of the rules.
Of course, there are still misdeeds by foundations or their managers, but
these typically involve family foundations with unsophisticated managers. 80
Whether or not one feels the private foundation rules are necessary, they
have worked well. Why? A primary reason may be that the foundation
sector has the resources to hire the lawyers, bankers, and managers who can
navigate through these complicated statutes and Treasury Regulations. In
addition, the 103,880 private foundations are easier for the IRS to monitor
than the 1,010,365 § 501(c)(3) charities on the IRS master files in 2004.81
But the most significant difference between the private-foundation and
public-charity worlds is that in the latter, most nonprofits have neither the
expertise in-house nor the resources to access the expensive legal talent
76. I.R.C. § 509(a) (2000).
77. Fishman, supra note 37, at 298.
78. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 46, at 283-84.
79. Marion Fremont-Smith, Is It Time to Treat Private Foundations and Public
Charities Alike?, 52 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 257 (2006). Congress has not agreed with her
proposal, doubling the excise tax penalties in the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-280, § 1212, 120 Stat. 780, 1074-75 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 4941-4945, 4958 (West
2007)).
80. The Massachusetts attorney general forced the scion of one of New England's oldest
families, Paul Cabot, to repay a family foundation more than $4 million that he had used for
personal expenses and compensation. See Robinson & Rezendes, supra note 30. Tom
D'Alessio, a New Jersey county executive, was convicted of extortion, money laundering,
and accepting a $59,000 bribe; he was sentenced to a forty-six-month federal prison term.
Two months after his release, he established the Evergreen Fund, a private foundation, and
endowed it with more than $1.8 million remaining from his campaign fund. In 2004, the
foundation gave $37,750 in $500 grants. It paid D'Alessio $81,708 as executive director,
leased a $45,665 Mercedes for him, and purchased a $432,000 luxury condominium on
Marco Island, Florida. See Ted Sherman, Loophole Lets Ex-con Fund His Retirement,
Newark Star-Ledger, June 12, 2005, § 1, at 1.
81. See Dep't of Treasury, supra note 34. The private foundation figure is from the
Nonprofit Sector in Brief 2007. Urban Inst., supra note 9, at 2 tbl. 1.
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necessary to assure compliance with a complicated enforcement regime
such as the private-foundation rules. The most significant implication of
the private-foundation rules was to make the IRS the primary regulator of
charitable fiduciary behavior.
F. Intermediate Sanctions
The use of excise taxes in place of the more draconian remedy of
revocation of tax-exempt status first migrated to the public charity world as
initial penalties for violations of the lobbying limitations and transgressions
of the political proscription. 82 And then later such use developed with the
enactment of the intermediate sanctions legislation that imposes a tax on
"excessive benefit transactions" by "disqualified persons," insiders who
receive excessive compensation. 83
The fundamental tax rule against opportunistic fiduciary behavior is the
prohibition against private inurement. In order to obtain exemption under §
501(c)(3), "no part of the net earnings may inure to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual" (insiders such as founders, directors or
officers).84 The private-inurement prohibition is "the primary distinction
between taxable and tax-exempt entities." 85 This rule, though first adopted
in 1909,86 remains "elusive, elastic," vague, and inconsistently applied. 87
82. In 1976, Congress added § 501(h) to the Internal Revenue Code, which enabled
charities to avoid the vague and subjective standard in § 501(c)(3), namely that "no
substantial part of [a charity's] activities ... [can involve disseminating] propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation." This section also permits charities to elect to
be governed by a more objective and mechanical expenditure test. Organizations that
exceeded the mechanical dollar lobbying limits triggered a twenty-five percent excise tax on
excessive lobbying expenditures. More frequent excesses could trigger a revocation of
exemption. In 1987, Congress concluded, in some circumstances revocation of exemption
under the original "no substantial lobbying" test might be irrelevant if the organization had
no taxable income or had accomplished its political objectives. Congress imposed an excise
tax on the charity equal to five percent of the excess lobbying expenditures. An additional
five percent tax was imposed on the managers, who made expenditures knowing they were
likely to cause revocation. There is no equivalent tax on an organization's managers that has
elected § 501(h). Taxes may be imposed on charities and their managers if they engage in
proscribed political campaign expenditures. I.R.C. § 4955 (2000).
83. I.R.C. § 4958.
84. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). A related "private benefit" doctrine prohibits § 501(c)(3)
organizations from providing a substantial economic benefit to individuals who do not
exercise control over the organization. As interpreted by the IRS, "private benefit" must be
more than incidental to disqualify an organization; in contrast to the absolute ban on private
inurement.
85. Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla of Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement
and Excess Benefit, 19 Va. Tax Rev. 575, 577 (2000).
86. Corporation Excise Tax of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112.
87. Jones, supra note 85, at 581. "[T]he courts and the Service are content to proceed as
though private inurement is as incapable of definition, but as easily recognizable, as
pornography. The result is a chameleon-like doctrine that seemingly defies precise
identification or prediction." Id. at 590. The absence of guidance, the generality of the
phrase, and the infrequency of the use of the sanction revocation of tax-exempt status
became a practical problem. The generality and ambiguity of the rule was insufficient to
signal normative behavior.
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Beyond the vague inurement proscription, federal law only dealt
specifically with fiduciary behavior of private foundations, where Congress
documented abuses by donors and insiders.8 8 State legal principles were
applicable in curbing excessive compensation, which was sometimes seen
as a less venal form of interested transaction.8 9 Congressional hearings in
1993 produced several outrageous instances of excessive compensation. 9 0
Though the existing federal law could penalize an organization by removing
recognition of its tax-exempt status, the IRS rarely, if ever, imposed such a
penalty, for the removal of exemption was like hanging someone for
stealing a loaf of bread. It was too draconian for the wrong, and it hurt the
organization rather than the individuals who engaged in the private
inurement. In response to this problem, Congress adopted the approach of
the private-foundation rules, imposing a graduated excise tax on "excess
benefit transactions" involving §§ 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations
other than private foundations, 9' a so-called intermediate sanction that
replaced the ultimate penalty of revocation of tax exemption.
The legislation itself did not define an excess benefit transaction, but it
placed a tax upon individual insiders who exercised substantial influence on
nonprofit organizations. 92 The regulations suggest a procedure whereby the
organization'can rely on a rebuttable presumption that the transaction is not
an excess benefit transaction: (1) if its terms were approved by a board or
board committee composed of individuals who have no conflict of interest;
(2) if disinterested board members relied upon comparable data; and (3) if
the board adequately documented the basis for its determination. 93
The regulations create guidelines for fiduciary behavior: those who are
interested in a transaction should not participate in the decision;
comparability requires the nonprofit board to examine whether the
transaction is fair; and adequate documentation is required. The
intermediate-sanctions approach is expensive for any organization of size
because it needs to be guided by experts, lawyers, and compensation
consultants, in setting salaries and creating paper trails indicating a
rebuttable presumption.94
88. I.R.C. §§ 4941-4945.
89. N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law § 715(e) (Consol. 2002) gives authority for fixing of
board compensation without any of the procedures applying to other interested transactions.
90. Subcomm. on Oversight of H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., Report on
Reforms to Improve the Tax Rules Governing Public Charities 14-15 (Comm. Print 1994).
91. Section 501(c)(4) organizations are civic leagues or organizations "not organized for
profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare." Contributions to such
organizations are not deductible.
92. For a description of the intermediate-sanctions regime, see Fishman & Schwarz,
supra note 13, at 488-96.
93. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c) (2002).
94. The regulations allow smaller organizations to obtain salary comparisons with
similarly sized organizations to gain use of the presumption that the benefit is not excessive.
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(ii).
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In the first few years after the intermediate-sanctions regime became
effective, the IRS imposed excise taxes for excessive benefit transactions in
only two cases that reached court, both particularly egregious violations. 95
The problem of excessive compensation remains, and the issue still raises
Congress's hackles. The Senate Finance Committee hearings in June 2004
offered several notorious examples of excessive compensation, and the
Pension Protection Act of 2006 doubled the dollar limit of the excise tax to
$20,000 on managers of public charities and social welfare organizations
that participated in an excess benefit transaction. 96 The IRS responded by
announcing a major initiative of a compensation review, which would
examine the salaries of executives of nonprofits that earned over $1 million,
typically health-care or investment managers. 97
The threat of such examinations and continued embarrassing disclosures
in the press 98 will force all nonprofits to become aware of this issue.
Though the IRS's audit capability has declined in recent years, its
reputation and the fear the IRS engenders may improve fiduciary behavior.
Over time the intermediate-sanctions legislation, and the IRS's recent
announcement of continued enforcement efforts, should strengthen the
nonprofit community's reluctance to engage in excessive benefit
transactions and result in more generally acceptable levels of compensation.
95. One involved the Bishop Estate. See Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 13, at 204.
The other case involved a group of health-care organizations acquired by a family in a
conversion transaction. Caracci v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 379 (2002). There have also been
several technical advice memoranda where the IRS has ruled that excise taxes should be
imposed under § 4958. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2004-35-020 (May 5, 2004); I.R.S.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 2004-35-019 (May 5, 2004); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 04-35-021 (May 5,
2004); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2004-35-018 (May 5, 2004); I.R.S Tech. Adv. Mem. 2002-
43-057 (July 2, 2002). The memoranda issued on May 5, 2004, all involved the same
organization.
96. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1212, 120 Stat. 780, 1074-
75 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 4941-4945, 4958 (West 2007)).
97. Press Release, IRS, IRS Initiative Will Scrutinize EO Compensation Practices (Aug.
10, 2004). In March 2007, the IRS issued a report on its Exempt Organization Executive
Compensation Compliance Project. IRS, Report on Exempt Organizations Executive
Compensation Compliance Project-Parts I and II (2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/exec.-comp.-final.pdf. The IRS sent compliance check
letters to 1826 exempt organizations- 1428 public charities and 398 private foundations. Id.
A second part of the project examined 782 organizations, of which 179 resulted from the
compliance checks, regarding reasonableness of executive compensation. Id. at 3. Over one-
third of the organizations had to file amended returns, but that reflected more the difficulty in
filling out the forms than subterfuges. Id. The examinations led to proposed excise taxes of
$21 million. Id. The issues giving rise to the assessments included excessive salaries and
incentive compensation, perks, and expense account payments. Id. at 7. Of the $21 million,
over $4 million involved individuals associated with public charities and the remaining $16
million involved persons with private foundations, but there was no breakdown between
disqualified individuals and an organization's managers. Id. at 5. The names of the
organizations were not released. Because the organizations selected were not a part of a
statistical sampling, the findings cannot be extrapolated.
98. See Stephanie Strom, IRS Finds Tax Errors in Reports of Nonprofits, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 1, 2007 at A15 (noting that Yale University was criticized for incomplete reporting on
Form 990).
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The revenue generated by the excise tax imposed for violations of the
statute will be nowhere near the transaction costs to all nonprofit
organizations as they try to ensure that their compensation structures will
not be perceived as excessive benefit transactions. The intermediate-
sanctions approach is an inefficient way to obtain reform of fiduciary
behavior. A more efficient approach to changing normative behavior might
be to create comparative standards based upon the size of the nonprofit and
its mission or concentration in the charitable sector or upon standards set by
private associations.
G. Contemporary Congressional Concerns and Proposals
to Improve Nonprofit Accountability and Governance
Media discoveries of conflicts of interest, excessive compensation,
diversion of charitable assets, inflated deductions for gifts of appreciated
property, and outright fraud attracted the attention of Congress, which held
a series of hearings that resulted in the most significant legislation affecting
nonprofits since 1969. 99 Title XII, subtitle B of the Pension Protection Act
of 2006100 dealt with some of the most pressing problems in the sector-
donor-advised funds, 101  supporting organizations, 102  conservation
easements, 0 3 tax-exempt credit counseling agencies, 0 4 donations of used
clothing and household items, 105 and some other abuses. The legislation
99. See S. Fin. Comm., Staff Discussion Draft (2004), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf. A background
document prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation in conjunction with the June 2004
hearings summarizes the law and includes extensive statistical data on tax-exempt
organizations. See J. Comm. on Taxation, Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform
Tax Expenditures (2005), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf; see also Staff of
the Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 68; S. Comm. on Fin., Charities and Charitable
Giving: Proposals for Reform (Apr. 5, 2005),
http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing030505.htm (listing witness statements for the
2005 Senate hearings); S. Comm. on Fin., Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad
Things from Happening to Good Charities (June 22, 2004),
http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing062204.htm (listing witness statements for the
2004 Senate hearings). The House hearings were informed by a comprehensive document
describing the history and present law of tax exemption. See J. Comm. on Taxation,
Historical Development and Present Law of the Federal Tax Exemption for Charities and
Other Tax-Exempt Organizations (2005), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-29-05.pdf;
see also H. Comm. on Ways and Means, Hearing Archives,
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?fonmmode=detail&hearing=400 (listing
witness statements for the House hearings). For an overview of the parameters of
congressional concern and proposals for reform, not all of which were enacted, see Fishman
& Schwarz, supra note 13, at 13-17.
100. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified in
scattered sections of the I.R.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
101. Id. §§ 1231-1235, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, 1094-1102 (codified in
scattered sections of the I.R.C.).
102. Id. §§ 1241-1245, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, 1102-08 (codified in
scattered sections of the I.R.C.).
103. Id. § 1213, I.R.C. § 170 (West 2007).
104. Id. § 1220, I.R.C. §§ 501, 513.
105. Id. § 1216, I.R.C. § 170.
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increased some penalties, though there seemed to be little need to do so
because there were so few violations. Thus, penalties were increased on
charitable organizations, particularly private foundations, for self-dealing
and excess benefit transactions; failure to distribute income; excess business
holdings; investments which jeopardize charitable purpose; and taxable
expenditures. There were also increases in penalties on managers of such
organizations for prohibited liabilities. 10 6
However, the legislation also included mandates that increased the costs
of compliance for some charities-small unsophisticated ones that cannot
afford compliance-and could have used the resources expended to better
achieve their mission. Exempt organizations with gross receipts, which in
each taxable year are not more than $25,000, are exempted from filing
Form 990 or Form 990-EZ, the annual information return. 107 Section 1223
requires organizations excused from filing an information return to annually
file electronically with the IRS certain information about the
organization. 10 8 Failure to file the required notice for three consecutive
years will result in revocation of tax-exempt status.10 9 The organization
will have to reapply to have tax-exempt status reinstated. Though the
information required is basic, many organizations are not Internet-ready or
sophisticated enough to file electronically. These very small organizations
may not have accountants or lawyers or might not hear about the new
requirement. The end result will be the removal from the IRS master list of
many worthwhile organizations. For those that manage to comply there
will be an increased cost. How much fraud will be deterred by such a
requirement?
It is doubtful that the IRS will be given sufficient resources to
substantially improve its oversight capability. Funding for enhanced IRS
enforcement could come from earmarking excise taxes imposed on private
foundations and public charities or from earmarking fees based on asset size
that would be imposed on exempt organizations that file Form 990
106. Id. § 1212, I.R.C. §§ 4941-4945, 4958.
107. I.R.C. § 6033(a) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(1) (as amended in 1995). Section
6033(a)(A)(ii) specifies a $5000 annual gross receipts exemption, but in I.R.S.
Announcement 82-88, 1982-25 I.R.B. 23, the IRS exercised its discretionary authority to
increase the exemption to $25,000.
108. Pension Protection Act § 1223, I.R.C. §§ 6033, 6652, 7428. These organizations
will have to file annually an electronic Form 990-N, known as the electronic postcard.
"Exceptions to this requirement include organizations who are included in a group return,
private foundations required to file Form 990-PF, and section 509(a)(3) supporting
organizations required to file Form 990 or Form 990EZ." IRS, Frequently Asked Questions
New Annual Electronic Notice-e-Postcard (Form 990-N) (2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/epostcard faqs-final.pdf. The organization must furnish its
legal name, any other name under which it operates or does business; its mailing address; the
taxpayer identification number; the name and address of a principal office; and evidence of
the organization's continuing basis for its exemption from the generally applicable
information return requirements. If the IRS has an incorrect address, the burden is on the
organization to provide the correct one. This will result in many organizations not even
receiving notification that they have to file the electronic postcard. See id.
109. IRS, supra note 108.
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information returns. Such earmarking has not occurred in the past. The
legislative proposals do not adequately consider the costs, needs, and lack
of sophistication of much of the nonprofit sector. There will still be a need
for an effective and efficient way to improve accountability, particularly
among smaller nonprofits below the radar of state attorneys general or the
IRS.
Discovering an efficient and effective enforcement procedure that will
hold fiduciaries accountable has been an age-old problem. Countering
fraud and misdealing and improving accountability can be dealt with in
several ways. One is new legislation and regulation, which was partially
achieved in 2006. However, many of the evils that Congress and other
critics identified were already illegal under existing rules. Additional
regulation imposes costs on all nonprofits, but cost-benefit analyses of this
approach are rarely conducted.
Vigorous enforcement of existing laws and regulations will reduce the
amount of fraud and scare organizations into being more accountable.
Enforcement, however, is expensive and time-consuming. At the state and
federal levels, agencies responsible for overseeing charities have many
other responsibilities, some of which, quite frankly, are more important than
monitoring nonprofit behavior.
Increased educational efforts can be helpful. Many state attorneys
general have improved the educational component of their web sites. 110
Perhaps the most important educational tool is the IRS's publication of
revenue rulings, revenue procedures, general counsel memoranda, technical
advisory memoranda, and private letter rulings. These provide guidance to
attorneys who represent nonprofits. However, the IRS has drastically cut
back on its formal pronouncements, diminishing its educational role. 11
Related to educational efforts is self-regulation by sector associations,
which typically create norms, guidelines, and rules for organizations to
follow.
110. See Cal. Office of the Att'y Gen., Charitable Trusts,
http://caag.state.ca.us/charities/index.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2007); Office of the Mass.
Att'y Gen., Non-Profits & Charities,
http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=cagotopic&L=2&L0=Home&L 1 =Non-
Profits+%26+Charities&sid=Cago (last visited Sept. 28, 2007); Office of the N.Y. Att'y
Gen., Charities, http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/charities.html (last visited Sept. 28,
2007).
111. See Thomas F. Field, Eleanor J. Lewis & Marion B. Marshall, The Guidance Deficit:
A Statistical Study, 13 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 57 (1996) (noting that the number of guidance
documents released to the public by the IRS has been steadily declining); Fred Stokeld &
Christopher Quay, Compliance, Reforms Dominate Talk at EO Conference, 48 Exempt Org.
Tax-Rev. 9 (2005) (explaining that because of a shortage of resources, the technical division
might not issue private-letter rulings in subject areas covered by other guidance and that it
will publish only continuing professional education articles when there is need).
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H. Suggestions to Improve Accountability
Leading commentators on the nonprofit sector have offered suggestions
to improve nonprofit accountability. Fremont-Smith recommends
removing the almost complete immunity from liability given to fiduciaries
in the last half of the twentieth century. 112 The problem with this proposal
is that for many nonprofits it is extremely hard to recruit knowledgeable
directors. If the position carries the dangers of lawsuits and liabilities,
recruiting will become even more difficult. Her second proposal is to
provide greater funding to regulatory agencies to improve enforcement. 113
That is surely a good idea, but the reality is that despite recent budget
increases for the IRS, the amounts do not keep pace with the increase in
new organizations. It is unlikely that Congress will devote sufficient
additional resources to qualitatively improve enforcement or to give the IRS
the right to retain fees it imposes.
Joel Fleishman, a former Duke University law professor and a foundation
president, once urged the creation of a new federal regulatory agency for
policing the nonprofit sector. 114 This is not a new recommendation. Over
forty-five years ago, Professor Kenneth Karst suggested the creation of a
new agency at the state level, a state board of private charities that would
have primary responsibility for supervising private charities and for
administering the various state controls over their operation. 115 Whether on
a state or federal level, is a new agency any more likely to gain sufficient
funding to make it an effective monitor of charities? Is the creation of
another government agency without the clout of the attorney general or the
IRS likely to improve accountability? It is doubtful.
I. Using the Form 990 Annual Report as an Accountability Tool
Peter Swords, former chairman of the Nonprofit Coordinating
Committee, an advocacy organization for charitable organizations,
suggested that the sector advocate for stronger generic oversight and for
stronger governmental regulatory agencies.'1 6 He recommends that private
nonprofit accountability groups work with state attorneys general to provide
direct assistance in meeting their goals, which does happen in several
states.117 Nonprofit groups should make the Form 990 more effective as an
112. Fremont-Smith, supra note 46, at 471.
113. Id.
114. Public Trust in Not-for-Profit Organizations and the Need for Regulatory Reform, in
Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector in a Changing America 172 (Charles T. Clotfelder &
Thomas Ehrlich eds., 1999). Marcus Owens, former head of the IRS's Exempt
Organizations Division, also reiterated that view with the caveat that, unless Congress was
willing to devote substantial new money and numbers of staff, it is unlikely there would be
any significant improvement, Schwinn & Williams, supra note 63.
115. Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State
Responsibility, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 476-83 (1960).
116. Swords, supra note 52.
117. Id. at 416 & n.10.
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accountability tool and should help with advocacy campaigns aimed at
providing more support for these agencies. 118 These sorts of initiatives are
currently taking place. The Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, formed in
response to the Senate Finance Committee hearings in 2004, recommended
several changes to the Form 990 annual-information return to improve
transparency, including electronic filing, more inclusive filing by all
nonprofits, and the use of consistent accounting methods in audited
financial statements and information returns. 119
J. Self-Regulatory Initiatives
Recently, Fleishman has reconsidered his earlier view, and now feels that
a governmental agency as he proposed "is so at odds with the history,
culture, and need for independence of America's nonprofit sector that it
would be unworkable and, in any event, is unlikely ever to be
established."' 20 Instead, he favors a proposal by Marcus Owens, former
director of the IRS Exempt Organizations Division and a leading exempt
organizations tax practitioner, which calls for the creation of a new
congressionally chartered, private not-for-profit organization that would be
related to but independent of the IRS to discharge its functions. Owens
does not believe that the IRS, as currently structured, is the best home for
charities supervision. 121 Fleishman would have this agency enforce laws
and regulations specifically targeting nonprofit fidelity to conflict-of-
interest, insider self-dealing, transparency, and comparable procedural
standards enforced by law. 122 The migration of fiduciary oversight to the
federal level would be formalized.
Owens's proposed new agency would be modeled on the National
Association of Securities Dealers and other self-regulating organizations
(SROs), such as the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board and the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, which assist the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in carrying out its responsibilities. 123 All the
SROs exercise oversight authority by virtue of their relationship with the
SEC. This new charity oversight agency would be related to but
independent of the IRS in much the same way that the National Association
of Securities Dealers is related to, but independent of, the SEC.124 It
118. Id. at 417-22.
119. Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency, Governance,
Accountability of Charitable Organizations 26-32 (2005), available at
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final.
120. Joel L. Fleishman, The Foundation 257 (2007).
121. Marcus S. Owens, Charity Oversight: An Alternative Approach (Hauser Ctr. for
Nonprofit Org., Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 33.4, 2006).
122. Fleishman, supra note 120, at 258.
123. Owens, supra note 121, at 11.
124. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2000) (registered
securities associations); id. § 15B, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (regulation of municipal securities
dealers); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, tit. 1, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211 (West Supp. 2007) (public
company accounting oversight board).
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"would be financed by allowing foundations to obtain a tax credit against
their federal foundation tax obligations for payments to support the new
agency's operations."125
The history of self-regulation of the financial services sector in both the
United Kingdom and the United States provides a cautionary tale and
demonstrates that self-regulation by an industry group is basically self-
protection. 126 The success of the self-regulatory bodies in the securities
industry has been due to the ongoing threat both implicit and explicit that
failure to regulate will bring harsher governmental sanction and
intervention. In fact, over the years in the United Kingdom and the United
States, the securities statutory bodies have had to increase their authority
over self-regulating organizations.
It is doubtful that the IRS will play the same role as the SEC. For one
thing, it is not an independent agency. Secondly, the IRS has many other
responsibilities, which, if recent history is a guide, take priority over the
tax-exempt sector. Much of the IRS's recent interest in abuses has been the
result of congressional pressure. If the IRS is starved for resources, will
Congress allow, and would the IRS want, money allocated to the
supervision of exempt organizations to be used for fiduciary oversight?
The Panel on the Nonprofit Sector has also proposed a viable system of
self-regulation and education.' 27  Private groups can test, change, and
improve norms. The testing of current norms and their meanings and roles
is an important function of such organizations that lie between the citizen
and the state.1 28 In the nonprofit sector there are many such associations,
including the Independent Sector, the Nonprofit Coordinating Committee of
New York, and the Council on Foundations, to name a few. However, the
nonprofit sector is so large and diverse that professional associations and
other private organizations cannot provide sector-wide normative change on
their own.
A report examining self-regulatory bodies in the nonprofit sector
prepared by Professors Harvey Dale and Jill Manny, concludes,
125. According to Fleishman, foundations have paid between $300 million to $700
million, of which only $50 million has been allocated to the Exempt Organizations
Division's budget. See Fleishman, supra note 120, at 258.
126. James J. Fishman, The Transformation of Threadneedle Street: The Deregulation
and Reregulation of Britain's Financial Services 55, 298-99 (1993). Over the last sixty-five
years, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has exerted increasing authority over
self-regulatory organizations. See David A. Lipton, The SEC or the Exchanges: Who Should
Do What and When? A Proposal to Allocate Regulatory Responsibilities for Securities
Markets, 16 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 527, 528-30 (1983); see also Karen Talley, Levitt Expects
Wall Street to Fall Short, Wall St. J., July 24, 2001, at C13 (explaining that the former head
of the SEC expects little from Wall Street's efforts to police self-concerned analysts who
recommend companies that the analysts' firms seek to represent).
127. Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, supra note 119, at 21.
128. Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 947 (1996).
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Self-regulatory structures are frequently important contributors to the
integrity, efficiency, and overall health of various economic sectors in our
country....
In the resulting partial vacuum of governmental oversight, self-
regulation is an indispensable tool for setting, standards identifying
malfeasance and misfeasance, and improving the integrity and efficiency
of the nation's charities and social welfare organizations....
Expectations, however, should remain nuanced. In a free society, no
amount of governmental regulation and oversight, even coupled with
vibrant and vigorous self-regulatory initiatives, will prevent all nonprofit
fraud, misfeasance, or ineffectiveness. If the virtues of self-regulation are
trumpeted with too much enthusiasm, disappointment is inevitable when
scandals eventually occur....
Probably the single most significant factor contributing to the
effectiveness of any self-regulatory model is legal enforceability of its
standards. 129
For self-regulation to work, there would have to be a significant change
in the structure of oversight. The size of the tax-exempt sector makes such
a task seem impossible. 130 Self-regulation exists in certain parts of the
nonprofit sector-education and museums come to mind. This approach is
most effective for larger charities, which have the resources, experience, or
normative values to follow the accrediting organization's rules. Smaller or
recently formed organizations may be unaware of or financially incapable
of adhering to certain self-regulatory mandates, such as a requirement of a
certified audit. Organizations at the margins may have little desire to join
or may not be able to meet the standards of accrediting bodies.
129. Nat'l Ctr. on Philanthropy & the Law, Draft Study on Models of Self-Regulation in
the Nonprofit Sector (2005), available at
www.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/library/Self RegulationFinalReport-040307updates.pdf.
130. In fiscal year 2003, there were 12,830 reporting firms registered under §§ 12b and
12g of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which requires an ongoing disclosure system to
the SEC. SEC, Annual Report 2003, http://www.sec.gov/about/annrep03.shtml. There are
2764 companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and 3153 companies listed on
NASDAQ, two self-regulating organizations. This compares with a total of 1,680,061
exempt organizations on the IRS's master list. The nonprofit sector is an exponentially
larger universe. See NYSE Euronext, Listed Securities,
http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/1170350259411.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2007);
NASDAQ, NASDAQ Performance Report,
http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/stats/Performance-Report.stm (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
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III. NEW APPROACHES
A. Advisory Charity Commissions Under the Aegis of the Attorney General
It is doubtful that there will be a substantial increase in funding for
enforcement activity at either the federal or state levels sufficient to
improve charities' accountability. The only realistic way to increase
nonprofit accountability and to create new norms of fiduciary behavior is by
leveraging existing regulators' efforts within the nonprofit sector and
making them more efficient and in a variant of sector-wide self-regulation
by using private citizens in the service of state attorneys general.
It is better for the nonprofit sector and for the efficiency of regulation for
its locus to be at the state rather than federal level. Almost all charities are
incorporated at the state level. Historically, fiduciary norms have been
matters of state law. Moreover, at the state or local level, regulation will be
carried out at a more meaningful scale if members of the charity's
community can monitor, educate, and, where necessary, put into play the
legal mechanisms that institute accountability. Professor Cass Sunstein has
suggested that it is probably best to have a presumption in favor of the
lowest possible level of government, because it is closest to the people and
therefore most responsive to the people and most likely to be trusted. 13 1
Local efforts are more responsive to our constitutional structure of
federalism, which increasing federal regulation of state responsibilities
undermines.
This proposal recommends the creation of advisory charity commissions
under the ultimate supervision of state attorneys general. The advisory
charity commission structure and procedure, set forth below, has some
similarity to the commission procedure established under the seminal
Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601,132 as well as to contemporary lawyer
and judicial disciplinary bodies.
B. Proposed Charity Commission Procedures
Local charity commissions would be the initial filter for citizen
complaints about fiduciary or organizational improprieties by charities.
The commissions would serve under the aegis of the state attorney general.
In states with a substantial number of charities, such as New York or
California, charity commissions could be established on the basis of state
judicial divisions. Thus, New York has four appellate divisions and would
have four charity commissions. The charity commissions would be public-
private partnerships, which would imbue them with both a legal and moral
authority that a wholly private body or state agency could not engender.
They could also serve an educational or remedial function more easily than
a governmental enforcement agency alone.
131. Sunstein, supra note 128, at 952.
132. 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.).
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Each charity commission would consist of fifteen unpaid citizens, eight
appointed by the governor and seven by the attorney general. 133 Some
members would be individuals experienced in the nonprofit sector or
beneficiaries of nonprofit organizations' activities. Others would be
recruited from the general public. The chief administrator of each
commission would be an assistant attorney general. 134 Commissioners
would be appointed for three-year terms, which would be renewable
once. 135
A citizen could complain about a charity or an official of a nonprofit.
She would provide to the commission or its staff information to validate the
allegations. The commission would have the powers to investigate, hold
hearings, and subpoena witnesses and uncover evidence. Thereafter, it
could exonerate the charity or individual, resolve the problem by working
with the charity, recommend it to a service organization that might provide
assistance, or turn the matter over to the attorney general for routine
prosecution. This remedial function could be the most important effect of
the charity-commission process, for cumulatively it could inculcate new
sector-wide norms of behavior.
When a complaint comes before the charity commission, a panel of three
commissioners, randomly selected, would review the allegations and the
evidence. If the charges were in any way colorable, the allegations and
evidence would be turned over to the assistant attorney general who would
promptly serve a copy of the complaint on the accused organization or
individual or any other necessary parties and make a preliminary
investigation. The assistant attorney general would determine whether the
charity commission or the attorney general should have jurisdiction over the
allegations. If she has probable cause to believe the allegations are true, the
assistant attorney general would be responsible for initially subpoenaing
witnesses and gathering evidence that would be presented to the three-
person commission. Allegations of wrongdoing would be heard by the
three commissioners, who could dismiss the charge, seek additional
information, or place the matter before the full commission.
In the words of Judge Learned Hand, "[I]ndictments are calamities to
honest men." 136 The same applies to charities. Public investigations are a
disaster for a charity's reputation. Therefore, commission investigations
and hearings should be confidential, and a prime role of the charity
commissions should be to engage in settlement, conciliation, and
remediation if necessary to remove the force of the allegations. It is
133. There is precedent for such cooperation. In New York, the governor and attorney
general can appoint a deputy attorney general in charge of the Organized Crime Task Force.
N.Y. Exec. Law § 70a(2) (McKinney 2002).
134. The attorney general and other agencies could loan officials, but the legislature
should appropriate a sum for the maintenance of offices.
135. Initially, five commissioners would be appointed for three years, five for two years,
and five for one year, thereby creating a board with staggered terms.
136. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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assumed that many wrongdoings of charities flow out of nonfeasance or
ignorance. The three-member commissions could provide direction and
assistance in bringing the charity into line with procedures, mandates, or
law. Under the resolution process, the charity and the commission would
sign a settlement agreement whereby the charity would admit any wrongs,
might indicate changes it will make to bring itself into compliance, and
would agree to present a report within twelve months of the agreement date,
outlining the implementation of the suggested changes. These proceedings
and settlement would not be made public.
If a settlement could not be reached or there was probable cause for the
allegations, the three-member commissions would decide by majority vote
to turn the matter to the full commission for a hearing. The hearing before
the full commission should also be held in camera. The organization or
individual (the respondent) might file a written answer and appear with or
without counsel. If the respondent failed to appear, a default judgment
should be entered and the matter turned over to the attorney general for
enforcement.
Upon the conclusion of the hearing by the full commission, the matter
could be dismissed or settled, or an order could be issued requiring the
respondent to take certain steps to implement compliance, to pay the costs
of the investigation, and to provide a report in the manner of compliance. If
the commission found the respondent innocent of such charges, it should
issue an order dismissing those charges, which should also be transmitted to
the attorney general. The commission's report should not be made public.
If the commission found that the allegations were correct and no settlement
had been reached or order complied with, the matter should be turned over
to the attorney general who would handle it as part of his normal oversight
of charities.
When an individual or an organization has been summoned before a
three-member panel or the full commission, the individual or organization
might challenge any of the commissioners as having a conflict of interest.
If such conflict was found by the other members of the commission, the
particular commissioner must recuse herself from hearing the matter.
Annually, the charities commissions should issue a report summarizing the
number of matters brought to it and their method of disposition. An
underlying assumption of these advisory charity commissions is that local
enforcement by citizens in the community is the most efficient and effective
method of providing accountability and for providing support and
encouragement of the charitable sector.
One of the few interludes in history when there was an effective system
of oversight of charities was in the first quarter of the seventeenth century.
The charity commission procedure created under the Statute of Charitable
Uses of 1601137 provided that, upon complaints by local citizens of
fiduciary wrongdoing by trustees of charitable trusts, charity commissions
137. 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.).
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would be empanelled at the parish level to examine the charges. The
procedure was developed because of the inadequacies of the chancery court
in monitoring charitable abuses. Over 1000 decrees were issued by these
charity commissions in the period 1597 to 1625, compared to one or two
annually by chancery. 138
Attorney and judicial disciplinary committees offer useful current
analogies in terms of procedure and the use of private citizens backed by
the authority of the state. They invoke a public-private citizen partnership.
The public agency in the case of attorney and judicial disciplinary
proceedings is the court system. The purposes are similar to the charity
commissions: protection of the public, punishing wrongdoing where
appropriate, serving an educational or warning function if necessary, and
improving the reputation of the professional area. These disciplinary
committees also protect attorneys and judges against unmerited charges.
The hearings are civil in nature, but provide a modicum of due process.139
The disciplinary panels are composed of private citizens as well as
attorneys or judges under the legal authority of a public official, who, in
appropriate situations, can subpoena, investigate, and commence
disciplinary proceedings. Attorney and judicial disciplinary bodies have a
broad range of remedial powers ranging from dismissal of complaints to the
filing of formal charges. Because of the damage to reputation that even an
unmerited complaint can bring, the hearings are confidential until probable
cause is found. They also serve an educational function for those accused
of acts that do not rise to the level of a formal investigation.
C. Charity Commissions as Catalysts of Changes in Fiduciary Behavior
This proposal will bring an improvement in fiduciary behavior through
education, publicity, and the threat of investigation and prosecution. The
charity commissions could reach many organizations and their fiduciaries.
The educational functions and the fear of sanction by the attorney general
will force many organizations on the behavioral margin, that have been
brought to the attention of the commissions, to change their behavior and
governance patterns. Most of these fiduciaries will understand their
obligations and internalize them. 140 In due course, new social norms will
emerge, expressing higher fiduciary expectations. The charity commissions
will encourage adherence to the social norm of following fiduciary rules by
increasing the possibility of enforcement and extending the reach, though
indirectly, of government investigation.
138. See Jones, supra note 45, at 47-56.
139. For a more detailed description of how attorney and judicial disciplinary committees
work, see James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 Md. L. Rev. 218, 279-
86 (2003).
140. Cf Robert Cooter, Expressive Law & Economics, 27 J. Legal Stud. 585, 585-86
(1998).
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One area where the charity commissions could encourage new patterns of
behavior is conflicts of interest. The commissions could encourage
fiduciaries to establish conflict-of-interest policies and to sanitize interested
transactions by requiring full, not material, disclosure and by encouraging
nonprofits not to include the interested directors or officers for voting or
quorum purposes. This could be achieved in a simpler, less expensive, and
more effective way than the use of traditional federal or state resources,
which are in such short supply. First, the organizations brought before the
commissions would be taught, encouraged, or sanctioned to obey these
rules. Second, cumulative reporting of the commissions' actions would
give publicity to the need to deal with conflicts of interest. Most fiduciaries
desire to live up to the norms of society, but they have to know what these
norms are. Publicity generated by the charity commissions would signify
the seriousness of types of fiduciary breaches.
The proposed charities commissions offer an effective and efficient
method of increasing resources of state regulators at a minimum cost and
complement federal initiatives. If successful, the charity commissions will
signal that they are not principally enforcement arms but remedial bodies
that will build trust and encourage people to report serious problems. They
will provide a channel for citizen action resulting from increased
transparency provided by the Internet. They will leverage the enforcement
capacity of the attorney general and return the focus of regulation to a more
local level by involving interested citizens. Because of their breadth of
remedial powers, charity commissions can educate charities and resolve
minor problems. They can offer a partnership between the nonprofit
community and regulators, which avoids the problems of industry self-
regulation that so often turns into self-protection. They will return the focus
of fiduciary regulation to the state or local level, where it belongs, and
should be more effective at less cost to regulators and to charities.
Moreover, they will allow the IRS to do what it does best: ensuring
adherence to the federal tax laws.
D. New Structures for Charitable Activity:
Social Enterprise Organizations
Thus far, this essay has criticized some assumptions and recent
regulatory developments in the nonprofit world. There has been one
encouraging development: the emergence of social enterprise
organizations, specifically for-profit vehicles committed to philanthropic
activity. This section raises some questions and reservations about social
enterprise organizations.
Social enterprise firms have been characterized as for-benefit
corporations that inhabit a "fourth sector" of society composed of
organizations driven by social purposes and financial promise that fall
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between traditional businesses and charities. 14' The social enterprise
movement is based upon the belief that market forces offer a more flexible,
efficient, and effective approach to promoting the public good than
traditional charitable nonprofits, such as private foundations, which are
subject to a restrictive regulatory regime.14 2 These organizations would not
be concerned with the tax issues that envelope traditional charitable
activity. They would be fully taxable, and could issue shares of stock and
return profits for investors, who would be shielded from shareholder attacks
for failing to maximize profits. 143 The private sector will be encouraged to
invest in social enterprises because they will derive a financial return while
providing a public benefit.
The most recent American catalyst for social enterprise investment was
the announcement that Google Inc. would pledge one percent of the
company's stock, worth $1 billion, and one percent of its annual profits
over the next twenty years to invest in businesses with a social purpose. 144
Initially, Google Inc. established a traditional private foundation to which
has been committed $90 million. The second charitable vehicle,
Google.org, to which most of the support would be given, is a for-profit
corporation. There are two important differences between these
philanthropic vehicles. The assets of the Google Foundation must remain
permanently in the charitable stream. If the foundation decides to dissolve,
its assets remaining after liabilities have been paid must be distributed to
another 501(c)(3) organization.145 If Google.org dissolves, its remaining
assets can be refunded to donor-investors. A second difference is that the
Google Foundation cannot return profits or dividends to its donors, whereas
Google.org may declare dividends to investors. 146 Other businesses and
entrepreneurs, such as private equity funds, have also formed large pools of
capital for social purposes outside of charitable tax-exempt structures. 14 7
These "social enterprise organizations," as they are called, have appeared
both in the United States and the United Kingdom.
For-profit public benefit ventures raise several questions. Are they
charities? Are they a new phenomenon? Are they more efficient and
effective than traditional charities? Are social enterprises permanent
entities or merely reflections of transitory stock market success or rising
141. Strom, supra note 12 (explaining that government, private, and nonprofit sectors are
the other three).
142. See id.
143. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
144. Nicole Wallace, Blending Business and Charity, Chron. of Philanthropy, Sept. 28,
2006, at 14; Katie Hafner, Philanthropy Google's Way: Not the Usual, N.Y. Times, Sept.
14, 2006, at Al.
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (as amended in 1990).
146. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) requires in part that no part of the net earnings of an
exempt organization can inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
Charities can pay interest on tax-exempt bonds they have issued.
147. See Jenny Anderson, A Hedge Fund with High Returns and High Reaching Goals,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2006, at F14; Stephanie Strom, What's Wrong with Profit, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 13, 2006, at F 1.
2007]
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
earnings? Should they receive tax benefits? If so, under what
circumstances? 148 Do social enterprise organizations live up to their hype?
"Social entrepreneurships" or "social enterprises" are phrases with many
meanings, some with almost religious overtones. 149 One definition is that
they are organizations for "people who use the techniques of business to
achieve positive social change."' 150 The United Kingdom's new Office of
the Third Sector, a cabinet level office that has promoted a social enterprise
initiative, defines social enterprises as "business[es] with primarily social
objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the
business or in the community, rather than being driven by the need to
maximize profit for shareholders and owners." 151 There are programs in
social entrepreneurship at leading business schools. 152
An assumption underlying the use of the social enterprise structure is that
because they are for-profit, they will utilize modem business techniques,
and therefore will be more efficient and effective than their charitable
148. For an argument that for-profit entities should receive the same tax advantages as
nonprofits, see Eric Posner & Anup Malani, The Case for For-Profit Charities (Univ. of
Chicago Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 304, 2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=928976. There is no good argument for making those tax subsidies
available only to charities that adopt the nonprofit form.
149. One definition of social enterprise states,
Social entrepreneurs play the role of change agents in the social sector by:
" Adopting a mission to create and sustain social value (not just private
value),
* Recognizing and relentlessly pursuing new opportunities to serve that
mission,
" Engaging in a process of continuous innovation, adaptation and learning,
* Acting boldly without being limited by resources currently in hand, and
" Exhibiting heightened accountability to the constituencies served and for
the outcomes created.
J.G. Dees, The Meaning of Social Entrepreneurship (2001), available at
www.fuqua.duke.edu/centers/case/documents/dees-SE.pdf; see also Gordon M. Bloom, The
Social Entrepreneurship Collaboratory (SE Lab): A University Incubator for a Rising
Generation of Leading Social Entrepreneurs (Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs., Working
Paper No. 31, 2006).
150. Jung E. Chio & William F. Meehan, Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus., Ashoka:
Innovators for the Public (North American Program) (2006).
151. Office of the Third Sector, Social Enterprise Action Plan: Scaling New Heights 11
(2006),
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/third-sector/documents/social-enterprise/se-action-plan-
%202006.pdf.
152. See, e.g., Columbia Bus. Sch., The Social Enterprise Program,
http://www.gsb.columbia.edu/socialenterprise (last visited Sept. 28, 2007); Duke Fuqua Sch.
of Bus., Center for the Advancement of Social Entrepreneurship,
http://www.fuqua.duke.edu/centers/case (last visited Sept. 28, 2007); Harvard Bus. Sch.,
Social Enterprise Initiative, http://www.hbs.edu/socialenterprise/ (last visited Sept. 28,
2007); N.Y. Univ., Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies,
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/berkley/social.cfm?docid=1868 (last visited Sept. 28, 2007);
Oxford Said Bus. Sch., Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneurship,
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/skoll/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2007); Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus.,
Center for Social Innovation, http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/csi/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2007);
Yale Sch. of Mgmt., Program on Social Enterprise, http://pse.som.yale.edu (last visited Sept.
28, 2007).
[Vol. 76
RECENT NONPROFIT DEVELOPMENTS
counterparts. This attitude ignores the fact that many nonprofit
organizations use modem business principles to achieve their goals and, by
any standard, are efficient. Correspondingly, many for-profit firms are
inefficient. The recognition that philanthropy should not necessarily be
attached to a tax-exempt vehicle is a salutary development. There is so
much that needs to be done. In certain areas, such as cross-border giving, a
for-profit vehicle may have more flexibility and fewer transaction costs than
a private foundation. 153
E. The United Kingdom Approach to Social Enterprise:
The Community Interest Company
According to the British government there are an estimated 55,000 social
enterprise-type organizations in the United Kingdom. 154 Social enterprises
are businesses with social objectives whose surpluses are primarily
reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the community, rather than
being driven by the need to maximize profits for investors. Since July
2005, social enterprise firms have had statutory backing and can register as
a specific type of corporation, a community interest company (CIC). 155 As
of April 2007, nearly 900 such organizations have been formed. 156 What
distinguishes the CIC from Google.org is the permanence of assets devoted
to community interest or social enterprise use. There is a statutory lock on
a CIC's assets, a partial non-distribution constraint. 157  The asset lock
means that, if upon dissolution there are residual assets remaining after the
payment of liabilities, the assets can be distributed to members or
153. The advantages of social enterprise firms compared to traditional charities are
discussed in Robert A. Wexler, Social Enterprise: A Legal Context, 54 Exempt Org. Tax
Rev. 233 (2006); see also Rosie Parr, Charities: Showing Interest, 157 Solic. J. 226 (2007).
For a criticism of the social enterprise approach for nonprofits, see Ben Casselman, Why
'Social Enterprise'Rarely Works, Wall St. J., June 1, 2007, at W3.
154. Office of the Third Sector, Social Enterprise Plan,
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/third-sector/socialenterprise/action plan/ (last visited Oct.
28, 2007). The author wishes to thank Betsy Buchalder Adler for introducing him to
community interest companies (CIC).
155. Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, c. 27, § 26
(Eng.).
156. Cmty. Interest Regulator, List of Community Interest Companies (April 2007),
www.cicregulator.gov.uk/coSearch/companyList.shtml. Previously, social enterprise
organizations have existed in a variety of structural formats: companies limited by share or
by guarantee without share capital, partnerships, limited partnerships, cooperatives, or
societies for the benefit of the community. Parr, supra note 153, at 226. Companies limited
by shares are traditional corporations. A company limited by guarantee is an alternative type
of incorporation used primarily for nonprofit organizations that require corporate status. It
does not have shares but has members, who are guarantors instead of shareholders. The
guarantors give an undertaking, as little as £1, which is the limitation of liability of the
guarantors if the company is dissolved. Until the Charities Act of 2006, companies limited
by guarantee were the only incorporated forms available as charities.
157. Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, c. 27, § 31
(Eng.); Community Interest Company Regulations, 2005, S.I. 2005/1788, art. 23 (U.K.).
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shareholders but only up to the paid-in-value of the shares held. 158 If there
are residual assets after distribution to members, the remaining assets must
remain in the community interest stream and be distributed to another CIC
named in the articles of the company or distributed as the regulator of CICs
directs. 159
On a continuum, CICs are somewhere between for-profit firms and
traditional charities. The justification for statutory backing was that until
2006, the purposes for which charities could be formed were more limited
than in the United States. CICs can be formed for any lawful purpose, but
must provide benefit to the community. Their formation is governed by an
expansive community benefit test, which is broader than the public benefit
test that must be met to be classified as a charity.1 60 A CIC will satisfy the
community benefit test if "a reasonable person might consider that its
activities are being carried on for the benefit of the community." 16' As yet,
there are no tax benefits from adopting CIC status.
A major difference between a charity and a for-profit firm is that the
latter has the ability to issue shares and declare dividends. 162 CICs can
have shareholding investors and pay dividends, which are limited by
regulation. 163 Another distinction is that English charities cannot reimburse
board members and managing directors, but CICs can.164
CICs offer the advantages of limited liability. They can engage in more
commercial activity than a charity but are less regulated. A CIC must file
an annual report describing how its activities benefited the community and
provide financial information as to dividends, interest paid, and
compensation of directors, but the reporting is less extensive than that
158. Community Interest Company Regulations, 2005, S.I. 2005/1788, art. 23, 1-3
(U.K.).
159. Id. § 23(4)-(1 1). A CIC cannot distribute assets to members by way of redemption,
purchase of shares, or reduction of share capital. Id. §§ 24, 25.
160. See Charities Act, 2006, c. 50, §§ 1-5 (Eng.).
161. Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, c. 27, §
35(2) (Eng.). "Community" includes a section of the community, whether in Great Britain
or elsewhere. Id. § 35(5). The regulations add that for the purposes of the community
interest test, any group of individuals may constitute a section of the community if it shares a
readily identifiable characteristic and other members of that community do not share that
characteristic. Community Interest Company Regulations, 2005, S.I. 2005/1788, art. 5
(U.K.).
162. Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, c. 27, § 30
(Eng.).
163. Community Interest Company Regulations, 2005, S.I. 2005/1788, arts. 17-22
(U.K.). The dividend cap regulations are complicated. Basically, the share dividend cap, a
maximum rate for determining dividends per share, is a percentage of the paid-up value of a
CIC share which can be five basis points higher than the Bank of England's base lending
rate. The aggregate dividend cap, a cap for determining the maximum aggregate dividends
that can be declared, is set at thirty-five percent of a company's distributable profits. There
is also a cap on the interest that can be paid on debt. The regulator of CICs can adjust the
caps. The members or shareholders cannot vote to amend or remove the asset lock.
Tangible assets can be sold, but the proceeds must remain asset locked.
164. Id. arts. 30-33.
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required for charities. 165 The CIC sector is overseen by the regulator of
CICs, who has publicly stated that regulation will be by a "light touch."' 166
While many administrative agencies exercise a light touch or lax oversight,
it is rare for a regulator to admit this fact so candidly. Whether light touch
means no touch remains to be seen. The regulator has substantial reserve
powers. 16
7
The CIC social enterprise sector is involved in all parts of the economy,
including local community and business enterprises, environmental and
social welfare organizations, mutual organizations such as cooperatives,
day-care and recycling centers, low-cost housing, and preservation
efforts. 168 They are particularly useful vehicles for joint projects with units
of government. ' 69
F. Old Wine in New Bottles? The Uniqueness
of the Social Enterprise Form
From much of the publicity, one would surmise that social enterprise
organizations, like the Google phenomenon itself, are something new. In
fact, involvement in social benefit activities regardless of the structure of
the organization or benefits of tax exemption runs deep in Western history.
Most philanthropic activity has been based not upon tax advantage but
religious principle. 170  It is sometimes overlooked that the charitable
165. Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, c. 27, § 34
(Eng.); Community Interest Company Regulations, 2005, S.I. 2005/1788, arts. 26-28 (U.K.).
166. Dep't Trade & Indus., Community Interest Companies: The Regulator of
Community Interest Companies 11-12 (2005), available at
http://www.sel.org.uk/docs/cicfactsheet2.pdf; see Regulator of Cmty. Interest Cos.: Report
to Secretary of State for Trade & Industry: Year to 31 March 2006 (2006). The statute
specifies that the "Regulator must adopt an approach which is based on the principle that
those powers should be exercised only to the extent necessary to maintain confidence in
community interest companies." Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community
Enterprise) Act, 2004, c. 27, § 41(1) (Eng.).
167. These include powers of investigation, audit, civil proceedings, appointment and
removal of directors, winding up and dissolution of CICs, and transferring assets and shares.
Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, c. 27, §§ 41-51
(Eng.).
168. Political activities are not considered for the benefit of the community unless
incidental to other activities if a reasonable person would consider them carried on for the
benefit of the community. Community Interest Company Regulations, 2005, S.I. 2005/1788,
art. 3 (U.K.). An activity is not carried on for the benefit of the community if a reasonable
person might consider that the activity benefits only the members of a particular body or the
employees of a particular employer. Id. art. 4.
169. Many local government units engaged in redevelopment or providing social services
would rather work with a CIC than a charity because managing directors can be paid a
market rate, which is not possible for charities-the assumption being that professional
management will be more cost efficient. Parr, supra note 153, at 226.
170. Deuteronomy 15:7 ("If there is among you anyone in need, a member of your
community in any of your towns within the land that the Lord your God is giving you, do not
be hard-hearted or tight-fisted toward your needy neighbor."); Deuteronomy 15:10-11
("Give liberally and be ungrudging when you do so, for on this account the Lord your God
will bless you in all your work and in all that you undertake.); Matthew 5:42 ("Give to
2007]
FORDHA M LA W RE VIE W
deduction dates only from 1917,171 the estate tax from the following
year,172 and the gift tax from 1924.173 Philanthropic impulses of the more
affluent today are usually driven by tax considerations; however, the nearly
eighty percent of American taxpayers, those who do not itemize their
deductions, give without regard to the tax consequences. 174
From a historical perspective, social enterprise corporations are nothing
new. In England in 1841 the Metropolitan Association for Improving the
Dwellings of the Industrious Classes was formed "for the purpose of
providing the labouring man with an increase of the comforts and
conveniences of life, with full compensation to the capitalist." 175 After four
years of effort the association raised shares totaling £20,000. It obtained a
royal charter of incorporation to limit liability of the shareholders,
and as a feeling then existed that too large a profit should not be made out
of the class of tenants intended to be benefited, the charter limited the rate
of dividend to five percent; any surplus, after providing a guarantee fund
not exceeding £15,000 to be applied in extension of the object [surplus
profits going to expand the organization's operations]. 176
The association built blocks of apartments for multifamily occupancy,
and was a model for other semi-philanthropic, semi-investment vehicles
that were based on business principles. By the 1870s, the association had
erected 6838 dwellings at a cost of £1,209,359 and claimed to have paid for
everyone who begs from you and do not refuse anyone who wants to borrow from you.");
Qur'in 57:18, reprinted in The Meaning of the Glorious Koran 388 (Marmaduke Pickthall
trans., Everyman's Library 1992) ("Lo! those who give alms, both men and women, and lend
on to Allah a goodly loan, it will be doubled for them, and theirs will be a rich reward.")
Qur'5n 2:177, reprinted in The Meaning of the Glorious Koran 48, supra ("It is not
righteousness that ye turn your faces to the East and the West; but righteous is he who
believeth in Allah and the Last Day and the angels and the Scripture and the Prophets; and
giveth his wealth, for love of Him, to kinsfolk and to orphans and the needy and the wayfarer
and to those who ask, and to set slaves free; and observeth proper worship and payeth the
poor-due. And those who keep their treaty when they make one, and the patient in
tribulation and adversity and time of stress. Such are they who are sincere. Such are the
God-fearing."); see also Robert Bremner, Giving 11-20 (2000).
171. War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
172. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 403(a)(3), 40 Stat. 1057, 1098 (1919).
173. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 319-324, 43 Stat. 253, 313-16; see David E.
Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 531, 538 (2006).
174. In 2003, 29.6% of tax returns itemized charitable deductions. Am. Ass'n of
Fundraising Counsel Trust for Philanthropy, Giving USA 2005, at 67 tbl.1 (2005). In dollar
terms, itemizers typically account for around 80% of total individual donations. See, e.g.,
Cong. Budget Office, Effects of Allowing Nonitemizers to Deduct Charitable Contributions
6 fig. 1 (2002), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/40xx/doc4008/12-13-
CharitableGiving.pdf, quoted in Pozen, supra note 173, at 553 n.109. Those who take the
standard deduction as a group are poorer but more generous in relation to percentage of
income donated compared to more affluent taxpayers.
175. Charles Gatliff, On Improved Dwellings, 38 J. Statistical Society 33 (1875),
reprinted as Charles Gatliff, On Improved dwellings and Their Beneficial Effect on Health
and Morals, and Suggestions for their Extension I (Edward Stanford ed., 1875).
176. Id. at 2.
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the five years from 1869 to 1874 a dividend of 4.5%.177 Many enlightened
factory owners built housing for their employees and received a below
market return. There were mixed motives. Efforts to improve employee
welfare through decent housing, later pejoratively termed "company
towns," tied employees to their jobs.
In 1874, Member of Parliament U.J. Kay-Shuttleworth addressed the
House of Commons about the work being done in building improved
habitations by various societies and companies, "some of a philanthropic
character, others half philanthropic and half commercial, some of a purely
commercial character, many of which were set on foot and are carried on by
private individuals who have shown an example for others to follow."'1 7 8
Urging private developers to invest in renovated housing, because
community benefit projects could be profitable, he stated,
Some companies, it must be admitted, have been failures: others have
paid very little; but when wisely managed they have set an example which
private individuals and speculators may follow, for they show that
dividends at the rate of 5 per cent. can be obtained.179
The Office of the Third Sector traces social enterprise organizations back
to the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, one of the early
cooperatives, whose principles or rules were widely adopted by the
cooperative movement. 180 One of the principles was payment of limited
interest on capital.181 There is also a long tradition in the United Kingdom
of cooperative mutual benefit societies. There are two forms of such
societies: bona fide cooperatives run by their members, as was Rochdale,
and community benefit societies. Recent legislation has allowed these
organizations to choose to have asset locks for the benefit of the
community. 182
In the United States, the phrase "public benefit corporation" is currently
used as a synonym for a 501(c)(3) charity, but its original meaning was a
for-profit corporation that provided a social benefit.183 During the colonial
177. Id. at2, 14.
178. 218 Parl. Deb., H.C. (3d ser.) (1874) 1960-61.
179. Id. at 1963-64.
180. Office of the Third Sector, supra note 151, at 11.
181. Another principle was that profits would be distributed to each member in proportion
to the amount of money expended at the stores. The Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers
was a group of weavers and other artisans who formed a cooperative in 1844, opening a
store that sold food, and developed a series of rules and principles for cooperative
organization. Though the Rochdale Pioneers were not the first cooperative, their principles
were adopted internationally. See W. Henry Brown, The Rochdale Pioneers: A Century of
Co-operation in Rochdale 22 (1944); George Douglas Howard Cole, The Rochdale
Principles: Their History and Application 3-6 (1947).
182. Co-operatives and Community Benefit Societies Act, 2003, c. 15, § 1 (Eng.).
183. Early corporate charters, particularly in the recitals of their purposes, emphasized
that the corporate purposes were public in the sense of managing and ordering trade as well
as the private goal of earning profit for shareholders. See Samuel Williston, The History of
the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, in 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal
History 195, 201 (Ass'n of Am. Law Schs. ed. 1909).
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period business corporations were few and of little importance. Many of
the colonial business corporations would be considered cooperatives or
quasi-philanthropic entities today. They were incorporated for the purpose
of erecting bridges, building or repairing roads, or promoting ends of
general public utility. 184 They seemed to fit the current definition of social
enterprises.
After independence, most states actively encouraged the incorporation of
private associations that performed vital public services. 185 In the beginning
of the nineteenth century, incorporation was by petition to the legislature.
Corporate charters were given to those who were thought to be public
stewards rather than private ones. 186 New England led the new nation in
the creation of corporations, both for-profit and charitable. The early
business corporations were strictly limited in purpose and were expected to
serve the public good.
G. Some Reflections and Further Questions
About Social Enterprise Organizations
The CIC reflects a particular need in the U.K. legal landscape because of
the restrictiveness of the pre-2006 public benefit test for charities, and the
lack of fit for some mutual benefit and social welfare organizations in its
tax scheme. One of the advantages of the multi-category I.R.C. § 501 is it
provides a tax-exempt home somewhere for most of the organizations that
fit under the CIC umbrella. Two major differences between CICs and
American social enterprise organizations are the asset lock and the
investor's right to receive limited dividends.
In the United States, social enterprises consciously blur the line between
charity and for-profit activity. At what point does an investment have
philanthropic objectives and when does it become a business decision?
Much will rest on whether the project is successful and if investors find the
activity sufficiently profitable. Determining social benefit is no easy task,
as nonprofits attempting to qualitatively measure mission success have
learned. Social benefit success may take years to achieve or determine, by
which time circumstances may change. Profitable companies backing such
efforts may in time suffer losses. Independent companies get taken over,
and firms' policies may change.
Let us assume Google Inc. is taken over by a private equity firm and
becomes Blackstone Google. In an effort to cut costs and close unprofitable
184. 2 Joseph Standcliffe Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations
87, 98, 103 (1917). Other early corporations would be considered mutual benefit
organizations or trade associations, such as the marine societies formed for the purpose of
bringing together mariners of a particular port. See generally Ronald Seavoy, The Public
Service Origins of the American Business Corporation, 52 Bus. Hist. Rev. 30, 38-39 (1978).
185. Ronald Seavoy, The Origins of the American Business Corporation, 1784-1855, at
255 (1982).
186. Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of the Private Nonprofit Sector, in The
Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook 4 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
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operations, Blackstone Google revokes the policy of donating one percent
of its profits to Google.org, and calls in outstanding loans. There is nothing
to prevent this from happening. In contrast, the Google Foundation would
continue to exist, its endowment intact. If it decided to go out of business,
any remaining assets would be given to another charity. This is not a
hypothetical situation. Ben & Jerry's, the ice cream manufacturer, had a
policy of donating a certain percentage of its profits to charity. When the
corporation was purchased by Unilever that largesse ended.187 In contrast,
a corporation whose charitable activities are channeled through a private
foundation will give in good times and bad, to the annoyance of investors
and employees. In 1997, when Boeing laid off thousands of employees and
suffered a $178 million loss, it still spent $51.3 million on philanthropy. 188
Social enterprise or for-benefit corporations represent an interesting
opportunity to expand philanthropy and good works. They are not charities
and do not offer the permanence of the private foundation. A concern about
social enterprise activities such as Google.org is whether they are fair-
weather donors. Should there be tax incentives to assure or at least
encourage that these sorts of ventures stay the course? Should for-profit
companies be eligible for program-related investments from private
foundations? Should there be a trade-off of providing tax benefits to such
firms in exchange for an asset lock? This could draw them closer to the
charity side of the continuum without harming their flexibility.
This is a period when we need to rethink the axioms that have governed
nonprofit law in recent years. This essay has suggested several
misconceptions that govern thinking about the nonprofit world. It has
traced the federal government's intrusion into traditional state matters of
nonprofit law and has presented a proposal to return the locus of fiduciary
regulation and oversight back to the state and local level. There are many
other initiatives that should be considered, including a need to rethink what
it means to be a charity as well as the development of new structures of
nonprofit activity to deliver charitable efforts.
187. Strom, supra note 11. The Body Shop and the And 1 Corporation, which also
contributed a percentage of their profits to charity, suffered the same fate when acquired.
188. Marianne Jennings & Craig Cantoni, Manager's Journal: An Uncharitable Look at
Corporate Philanthropy, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1998, at AI8.
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